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REHABILITATING THE PROPERTY THEORY OF
COPYRIGHT’S FIRST AMENDMENT EXEMPTION
Tun-Jen Chiang †
ABSTRACT
A continuing controversy in copyright law is the exemption of copyright
from First Amendment scrutiny. The Supreme Court has justified the exemption based on history and the intentions of the Framers, but this explanation
is unpersuasive on the historical facts.
There is an alternative explanation: copyright is property, and private
property is generally exempt from scrutiny under standard First Amendment
doctrine. Many scholars have noted this theory, but they have been harshly
dismissive towards it. For example, Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh view
the property theory as so clearly wrong as to be a “non sequitur,” because it
supposedly implies that Congress can declare anything to be property and
thereby circumvent the First Amendment.
This Article aims to rehabilitate the property theory. Contrary to its
critics, the property theory does not say that anything labeled “property” is
exempt, but rather contains two internal limits. First, the government-created rules of the property system must be content and viewpoint neutral,
though the private enforcement of those rules can be viewpoint motivated.
Second, even within the context of private enforcement, there must still be
some protection against excessive ownership power. Understanding the property theory, including its internal limits, then provides a powerful legal justification for the Court’s treatment of copyright law—one that is far better
than what the Court has itself articulated.
© 2013 Tun-Jen Chiang. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
A longstanding issue in the copyright literature is the relationship
between copyright law and the First Amendment. Copyright inherently restricts speech in the sense of prohibiting infringers from printing copyrighted books, selling copyrighted albums, or publicly
performing copyrighted plays.1 Notwithstanding this speech-restricting effect, however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that copyright is generally exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.2 Many
scholars have criticized this exemption as an unprincipled and unwise
carve-out from ordinary First Amendment jurisprudence.3 This Article seeks to defend the Court’s doctrine against these criticisms,
though it does so on grounds that are quite different from what the
Court has itself articulated. As I shall explain, copyright is and should
be generally exempt from First Amendment scrutiny because copyrights are a form of personal property, and the private enforcement of
a property right is generally not subject to First Amendment limits.
This claim might seem obvious, but it runs against the scholarly
consensus.4 For example, Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh call the
1 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (granting the copyright holder the exclusive right to
reproduce, distribute, and publicly perform or display a copyrighted work).
2 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–91 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 221 (2003). Although Golan and Eldred are relatively recent cases, they merely
solidify a de facto exemption that has long existed. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (stating that the First Amendment does not give newspapers
a right to commit copyright infringement); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13 (1977) (citing lower court cases approvingly that rejected First
Amendment challenges to copyright law); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2002) (arguing that “[c]opyright
law is a kind of giant First Amendment duty-free zone”).
3 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 182, 197–98 (1998) (arguing against
“[s]pecial [p]leading” for copyright); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright
Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37 (2001) (arguing “[c]opyright
[d]oes [n]ot [m]erit [s]ui [g]eneris [t]reatment”); Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 3
(arguing that copyright “flouts basic free speech obligations”).
4 An important exception is John McGinnis, who has argued that “there is no
fundamental tension between the First Amendment and Congress’s constitutional
authority to provide the security of copyright protection to some information producers” because the grant of copyright merely ratifies authors’ preexisting natural property rights. John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 79 (1996). My analysis here will differ from his in
focusing on reconciling copyright and the First Amendment on the level of doctrine,
rather than as a matter of high-level theory. The advantage is that a reader does not
need to share McGinnis’s Lockean view of copyright—a distinctly minority view—in
order to accept my conclusions.
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property theory a “non sequitur,”5 while Jed Rubenfeld calls it an
“unthinking defense” of copyright’s constitutionality.6 The unpopularity of the property theory is also reflected in the fact that, although
the Supreme Court has rejected the challenge to copyright’s constitutionality, it has done so entirely without reference to copyright’s status
as property.7 Instead, the Court’s rationale is based on the supposed
intent of the Framers of the First Amendment.8
My goal in this Article is to explain why the property theory is far
superior to the Framers’ intent theory in providing a coherent framework to explain the Court’s doctrine.9 And I argue that the scholarly
criticisms of the Court’s doctrine in this area are mistaken. Before
proceeding further, however, it is important to clarify what my argument is not about:
First, I make no claim about whether, as a matter of first principles, copyright should be considered property. My claim is only that,
as a matter of constitutional law doctrine, the status of copyright as
property is well settled, and I therefore take this status as a given for
purposes of my analysis. On the deeper theoretical question I am
agnostic.
Second, my claim does not endorse a Blackstonian view of property or of copyright. I am not saying that copyright’s status as property
means that it is subject to no First Amendment limits. Instead, a key
5 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 182 (“The argument that copyright law
should be exempted from standard First Amendment procedural rules because it protects property rights strikes us as a non sequitur.”); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J.
2431, 2445 (1998) (same).
6 Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 27; see also Netanel, supra note 3, at 39 & n.158;
Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 34 (2000) (explaining that “any interest can be
reconceptualized as a property interest to defeat a speech claim”).
7 Lower courts have sometimes suggested the rationale. See, e.g., Dall. Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979)
(“The [F]irst [A]mendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in
intellectual property.”).
8 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“The Copyright Clause and
First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the
Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles.”); id. at 200 (relying on the Copyright Act of 1790 to define the scope of congressional power under the Copyright Clause).
9 To put it in legal theory jargon, my argument is primarily about fit and justification. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1094 (1975) (arguing
that the goal is to “construct a scheme of abstract and concrete principles that provides a coherent justification for all common law precedents”).
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part of my argument is that the property theory provides limits on copyright that critics of the theory have overlooked.
Third, my normative claim is limited. My argument is that, as a
matter of doctrinal fit and coherence, the current copyright system
complies with the general doctrinal principles of the First Amendment as they have been applied by the Supreme Court in other contexts. I am seeking to refute criticisms of copyright’s First
Amendment treatment that are based on a claim of doctrinal inconsistency;
I do not seek to refute all such arguments categorically. In other
words, I make no claim that current doctrine is the “best” interpretation of the First Amendment as a matter of first principles. Nor do I
make any claim that, as a matter of fundamental copyright theory, the
existing protections within copyright law best promote the progress of
science or the balance of incentives and free speech. Those who wish
to argue for weaker copyright protection as a normative matter—
including those who wish to make this argument based on free speech
values—will find no opposition from me.
Now that I have clarified the scope of my claim, here is a
roadmap. In Part I, I first lay out the existing doctrine and explain
the inadequacies of the Framers’ intent theory. The existing doctrine
is that copyright is generally—but conditionally—exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny so long as it has a fair use defense and an idea/
expression dichotomy. The Framers’ intent theory neither explains
the general exemption nor the specific conditions. The theory cannot explain why modern copyright law, which is far broader and has a
much longer term than anything the Framers could have imagined, is
exempt. Nor can the theory explain why the exemption is conditioned on two legal doctrines that did not become part of American
copyright law until after the Framers were all dead.
In Part II, I lay out the property theory, which says that enforcement of private property rights is generally—but not automatically—
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. I will place particular
emphasis on explaining why the property theory does not mean that
anything labeled “property” is automatically excluded from the First
Amendment. The property theory has two important internal conditions that must be satisfied before it exempts the enforcement of a
private property right from First Amendment scrutiny. The first is
that the legal rules of the property system at issue must be content and
viewpoint neutral, even if individual private enforcement might
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depend on the viewpoint of a defendant’s speech.10 Thus, the fact
that Goldman Sachs might file a trespass suit against Occupy Wall
Street protestors would not endanger the exemption of real property
from the First Amendment, because the real property system as a
whole is neutral in allowing all landowners to broadcast whatever message they like on their own property. But libel—often mentioned by
the critics as an analogy to copyright11—is not exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny, because the libel system itself is not viewpoint
neutral: libel law punishes only criticism and not praise, and thus has
a tendency to mute debate in favor of the status quo and those already
in power.12 For this reason, defamation law is not exempt from the
First Amendment.
Second, even with regard to private case-by-case enforcement,
there must be some protection of free speech in cases of overwhelming private economic power. This is most aptly demonstrated by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh v. Alabama,13 which held that First
Amendment scrutiny applied to the private exercise of property rights
when a company owned the entire town and exercised such pervasive
ownership power that there was no reasonable alternative forum of
expression for the town’s residents.14 As this example demonstrates,
the property theory is neither formalistic nor inflexible: it does not
automatically exempt something from the First Amendment merely
because it is labeled “property.”
In Part III, I apply the property theory to the specific context of
copyright law. As this Part will discuss, the property theory explains
both the general exemption of copyright law from the First Amendment (because copyright is mostly content neutral at the systemic
level), and the specific conditions that qualify this exemption (the fair
use defense and idea/expression dichotomy serve to guard against
10 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (noting that the focus
is on the “state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on
their constitutional freedoms” (emphasis added)).
11 See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891,
905 (2002) (“[T]he First Amendment critique of copyright invokes New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan as the most relevant analogy.” (footnote omitted)); Lemley & Volokh,
supra note 3, at 149 (leading off with the libel analogy); Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 59
(“Copyright is today in the same position, vis-à-vis the First Amendment, as libel was
before New York Times v. Sullivan.”).
12 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268–78 (discussing the tendency of libel law to suppress criticism of those in power).
13 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
14 See id. at 505 (“Our question then narrows down to this: Can those people who
live in or come to Chickasaw be denied freedom of press and religion simply because
a single company has legal title to all the town?”).
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overwhelming ownership power). The payoff here is twofold. First,
the property theory provides a coherent framework to understand the
relationship between copyright and the First Amendment. Second, it
refutes the common argument that copyright’s First Amendment
exemption is unprincipled and aberrational.
In Part IV, I consider and refute some remaining arguments
against the exemption of copyright from the First Amendment. In
particular, I address the arguments that copyright is a content discriminatory restriction on speech, that copyright is distinct from other
property because it is non-rivalrous, that Congress can game the
exemption to grant property rights over disfavored speech, and that,
even under the property theory’s own terms, a First Amendment privilege is required because current protection for free speech is inadequate. This Part explains why each of these objections is misguided.
In Part V, I discuss some of the limitations of the property theory.
The property theory does not provide a complete defense of all of
copyright law. Perhaps most importantly, it applies only to private
enforcement of property rights, and thus it cannot defend copyright
law’s criminal provisions. I also briefly explore the implications and
fit of the property theory as applied to other areas of intellectual property. A brief conclusion then follows.
I.

THE COPYRIGHT EXEMPTION

AND THE

FRAMERS’ INTENT THEORY

A. Copyright’s Exemption from the First Amendment
Although formal recognition of the copyright exemption from
the First Amendment did not occur until the Supreme Court’s 2003
decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft,15 the de facto existence of such an
exemption has long been recognized in the academic literature. As
Jed Rubenfeld remarked in 2002: “Copyright law is a kind of giant
First Amendment duty-free zone. It flouts basic free speech obligations and standards of review. It routinely produces results that,
outside copyright’s domain, would be viewed as gross First Amendment violations.”16
More concretely, Rubenfeld posits a simple hypothetical to illustrate the tension between copyright and the First Amendment: a law15 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (holding that “when, as in this case, Congress has not
altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment
scrutiny is unnecessary”). Previously, in a footnote, the Court had cited, without
explicitly endorsing, a district court decision rejecting a First Amendment challenge
to copyright law. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13
(1977) (citing United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974)).
16 Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 3 (footnote omitted).
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suit for copyright infringement based on the defendant’s recital of a
poem in public.17 Quite obviously, a statute that banned the recital of
a poem in public would be viewed as an open-and-shut First Amendment violation.18 Rubenfeld’s implicit question is why copyright
enforcement is any different.
The scholarly literature that considers the tension between this
copyright exemption and the standard principles of the First Amendment begins with Melville Nimmer in 1970.19 Nimmer asked:
The [F]irst [A]mendment tells us that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Does not
the Copyright Act fly directly in the face of that command? Is it not
precisely a “law” made by Congress which abridges the “freedom of
speech” and “of the press” in that it punishes expressions by speech
and press when such expressions consist of the unauthorized use of
material protected by copyright?20

After identifying this apparent contradiction, Nimmer then
attempted to reconcile it. Nimmer argued that copyright law did not
really abridge free speech, because the fundamental purpose of copyright law is to incentivize the production of more speech than it
restricts.21 According to Nimmer, copyright law achieves its speechpromoting purpose through the idea/expression dichotomy, which
holds that copyright only protects an author’s expression while leaving the underlying idea for other people to copy and use.22 Although
copyright law “encroaches upon freedom of speech in that it abridges
the right to reproduce the ‘expression’ of others,” this encroachment
“is justified by the greater public good in the copyright encouragement of
creative works.”23
Nimmer’s article proved to be enormously influential, but probably not in the manner that he intended. Subsequent scholars have
generally agreed with Nimmer that there is a tension between copyright law and the First Amendment, but they have strongly disagreed
with him that the tension can be reconciled or that copyright should
17 Id. at n.1.
18 Rebecca Tushnet makes a similar argument, that “[c]opyright gives the government authority to seize books and enjoin their sale, award damages against booksellers, or even send them to jail.” Tushnet, supra note 6, at 4.
19 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970).
20 Id. at 1181.
21 See id. at 1189–93.
22 See id.
23 Id. at 1192 (emphasis added).
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be exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.24 The basic problem with
Nimmer’s reconciliation is that it makes no attempt to engage with
the First Amendment at a doctrinal level. Nimmer’s argument boils
down to saying that the entire body of First Amendment doctrine—
the elaborate set of general rules and principles that courts have built
up over decades—can be tossed aside whenever an encroachment on
free speech is deemed by some decision-maker to be “justified by the
greater public good.”25 Such ends-justifies-the-means reasoning is
extremely dangerous and opens the door to eviscerating the First
Amendment in numerous areas, as Lemley and Volokh explain:
Many kinds of speech restrictions may be seen as furthering free
speech values in some way. Justice White argued that libel law furthers free speech: libel law, he claimed, was needed in part because
“virtually unrestrained defamatory remarks about private citizens
[may] discourage them from speaking out and concerning themselves with social problems.” Some have argued that pornography
tends to “silence” women, which might suggest that obscenity law
may serve First Amendment values. Similarly, some have argued in
favor of banning racist speech on the grounds that it silences minorities. Others have claimed that restrictions on the speech of the
wealthy further free speech values by preventing well-funded speech
from “drowning out” other speech.26

The scholarly consensus that has emerged after Nimmer is therefore one that argues against “[c]opyright [e]xceptionalism”27—i.e.,
carving out copyright from standard First Amendment doctrinal prin24 For just some articles in this gigantic literature, in addition to those that have
been cited throughout this Article, see, for example, Mark Bartholomew & John
Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (2013); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act Is
Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 83 (2002); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free
Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283
(1979); Alan E. Garfield, The First Amendment as a Check on Copyright Rights, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 587 (2001); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair
Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/
Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J. 393
(1989); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833 (2000).
25 Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1192.
26 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 188–89 (alteration in original) (footnotes
omitted).
27 Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 1083, 1115 (2010) (arguing for First Amendment scrutiny of copyright).
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ciples just because doing so achieves good outcomes at a policy level.28
And because scholars have not found a coherent theory that reconciles the copyright exemption with standard First Amendment principles at a doctrinal level, they have “felled many trees” arguing that
courts should overrule the copyright exemption and apply First
Amendment scrutiny to copyright cases.29
Courts, however, have never adopted this scholarly consensus,
and have in fact gone in the opposite direction by cementing the copyright exemption into Supreme Court case law. The Court has now
expressly held that, so long as copyright law contains an idea/expression dichotomy and a fair use defense, it receives no First Amendment
scrutiny.30 In explaining how this holding comports with ordinary
First Amendment doctrinal principles—and presumably why the decision will not open the floodgates to every interest group seeking its
own carve-out—the Court relied on the Framers’ intent theory. Section B will summarize the Court’s articulation of the Framers’ intent
theory. Section C will then explain why the Framers’ intent theory
fails to reconcile copyright law with the First Amendment.
B. The Framers’ Intent Theory
The Supreme Court began delineating the Framers’ intent theory
in Eldred v. Ashcroft,31 which dealt with the constitutionality of the retroactive extension of copyright terms by Congress in the Sonny Bono
28 See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1537 (1993) (“Lawyers,
law professors, and even judges are on record pleading for the law to subject intellectual property to the same free speech principles that limit other assertions of governmental power.”); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 197 (arguing “[a]gainst [s]pecial
[p]leading for [c]opyright”); Netanel, supra note 3, at 37 (arguing against “sui
generis” treatment for copyright); Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 3 (criticizing copyright
as producing “results that, outside copyright’s domain, would be viewed as gross First
Amendment violations”). Somewhat surprisingly, Eugene Volokh seems to have
changed his mind and now accepts a copyright exception that is grounded in history
and economic policy rather than ordinary First Amendment doctrine. See Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44
Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 725 (2003) (“The text and the original meaning, coupled with the economic incentive argument, do indeed justify the
copyright exception.” (footnote omitted)). The scholarly consensus against a copyright carve-out, however, remains strong.
29 Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2007); see supra note 24 (collecting citations).
30 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–91 (2012).
31 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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Copyright Term Extension Act (the “Sonny Bono Act”).32 In addition
to making arguments based on the constitutional purpose of copyright (i.e., to promote progress), the petitioner in Eldred explicitly
argued that the extension of copyright terms violated the First
Amendment.33 Prior to this case, the question of the constitutionality
of copyright law under the First Amendment does not seem to have
been squarely presented to the Supreme Court.34
The Court rejected the First Amendment argument and upheld
the Sonny Bono Act in its entirety.35 In explaining its decision, the
Court first observed: “The Copyright Clause and First Amendment
were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the
Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with
free speech principles.”36 Based on this bit of originalist history, the
Court went on to hold: “We recognize that the [D.C.] Circuit spoke
too broadly when it declared copyrights ‘categorically immune from
challenges under the First Amendment.’ But when, as in this case,
Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”37
The bottom line of Eldred was that, although not everything
labeled “copyright” would be categorically exempt from First Amendment scrutiny, copyright within its traditional contours would be.38
This, however, immediately raises the question of what constitutes
“the traditional contours of copyright,” a standard that the Court did
not explain beyond saying that, whatever that standard meant, the
Sonny Bono Act did not exceed it.
The Court’s initial invocation of the Framers’ intent theory and
its cursory articulation of the traditional contours test then invited a
raft of law review articles and lawsuits to explore the boundaries of
32 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 302–304 (2006)).
33 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-618) (asking
whether copyright law is “categorically immune from challenge under the First
Amendment” (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
34 See Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft,
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2003) (“Surprisingly, Eldred is the first facial constitutional challenge to copyright law in 213 years.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power
to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 80 (2002)
(“Copyright provisions are rarely challenged on First Amendment grounds . . . .”).
35 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.
36 Id. at 219.
37 Id. at 221 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
38 See id.
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“the traditional contours of copyright.”39 If the Sonny Bono Act’s retroactive extension of copyright terms to author-life-plus-seventy-years
did not breach the traditional contours of copyright (when the historical copyright term was fourteen years from publication, renewable
once for a total of twenty-eight years), what did? After much debate
and conflict in the lower courts,40 the Supreme Court confronted the
issue in the case of Golan v. Holder.41
Golan dealt with the issue of whether section 514 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act,42 which retroactively granted copyright protection to some foreign works and thereby took them out of the public domain in the United States, was unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. The Tenth Circuit had held that section 514 exceeded
the traditional contours of copyright because it took works out of the
public domain.43 In other words, the lower court held that one traditional contour of copyright protection was the principle that “works in
the public domain remain there.”44 Perhaps surprisingly, the lower
court proceeded to uphold section 514; but it did so only after subjecting it to heightened First Amendment scrutiny.45
The Supreme Court disagreed with this analysis, holding that no
First Amendment scrutiny should have been applied at all. As an ini39 See, e.g., Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing
whether Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 exceeded the traditional contours of copyright); Golan v. Gonzales (Golan I), 501 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing
whether 17 U.S.C. § 104A exceeded the traditional contours of copyright); Luck’s
Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1262–63 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same); W.
Ron Gard & Elizabeth Townsend Gard, Marked by Modernism: Reconfiguring the “Traditional Contours of Copyright Protection” for the Twenty-First Century, in MODERNISM AND
COPYRIGHT 155 (Paul K. Saint-Amour ed., 2011) (claiming that copyright’s digital-age
crisis should be seen as an extension of a modernist crisis); Robert Kasunic, Preserving
the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 397, 398–401 (2007)
(detailing the traditional contours); Marshall Leaffer, Life After Eldred: The Supreme
Court and the Future of Copyright, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1597, 1605–06 (2004)
(examining Eldred’s First Amendment arguments); David S. Olson, First Amendment
Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1393, 1397 (2009) (arguing that
“the elimination of registration requirements and other formalities has significantly
altered the traditional contours of copyright”).
40 Compare Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1187–92 (holding 17 U.S.C. § 104A exceeded the
traditional contours of copyright), with Luck’s Music Library, 407 F.3d at 1265–66
(holding it did not).
41 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
42 Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–80 (1994) (current version at
17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006)).
43 See Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1187–92.
44 Id. at 1189.
45 See Golan v. Holder (Golan II), 609 F.3d 1076, 1083–84 (10th Cir. 2010)
(upholding § 514 under intermediate scrutiny).
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tial matter, the Court observed that Congress has in fact had a long
history of removing works from the public domain, tracing all the way
back to the First Congress and the first Copyright Act of 1790.46 The
lower court’s invocation of a traditional principle that copyright protection could not take works out of the public domain was simply bad
history.
The Supreme Court was not, however, prepared to leave its reasoning there. Instead, the Court went far further to offer a specific
definition of what constituted the “traditional contours of copyright
protection.” In purporting to summarize its holding in Eldred, the
Golan Court stated, “Concerning the First Amendment, we recognized
[in Eldred] that some restriction on expression is the inherent and
intended effect of every grant of copyright . . . . We then described
the ‘traditional contours’ of copyright protection, i.e., the ‘idea/
expression dichotomy’ and the ‘fair use’ defense.”47
The “i.e.” is crucial. In this short passage, the Court defines the
traditional contours of copyright as comprising an idea/expression
dichotomy and a fair use defense—and nothing else. At a bottom line
level, the doctrine concerning the interaction between copyright law
and the First Amendment is now reasonably clear: so long as copyright
law retains an idea/expression dichotomy and a fair use defense, it is
exempt from the First Amendment. Purportedly, this is all because
the Framers intended such an exemption. As the next Section will
explain, however, the historical facts simply do not fit the theory.
C. The Inadequacies of the Framers’ Intent Theory
If we take the Framers’ intent theory seriously, then the fundamental question of copyright’s exemption from the First Amendment
is whether modern copyright law conforms to the Framers’ expectations in 1791, when the First Amendment was enacted.48 The best
evidence we have in this respect is the Copyright Act of 1790,49 which
46 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 885–86 (“Notably, the Copyright Act of 1790 granted protection to many works previously in the public domain.”).
47 Id. at 889–90 (emphasis added).
48 One might argue that, as a matter of plain language, “tradition” need not be
understood as limited to the Framers but instead could encompass copyright practice
as it evolved throughout the nineteenth century. But this understanding of the “traditional contours” test—as a non-originalist theory that is based on a pragmatic concern
for stability and not on fidelity to original intentions—would make the Eldred Court’s
invocation of the Framers’ intentions a non-sequitur. I therefore view the test as
being about original intent.
49 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 [hereinafter Copyright Act of 1790]
(repealed 1831).
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was enacted by virtually the same group of people at virtually the same
time as the First Amendment. And if we compare modern copyright
law to the Copyright Act of 1790, it quickly becomes extremely evident
that modern copyright law has vastly exceeded anything that the
Framers would have expected, and has a much stronger speech-suppressing effect than what the Framers allowed.50 A few important
examples will suffice to illustrate this point:
Copyrightable subject-matter—The Copyright Act of 1790 allowed
copyright protection over only three types of things: maps, charts, and
books.51 Modern copyright law allows protection over any work that is
“fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” including visual works
such as paintings and sculptures, movies, sound recordings, architecture, and computer software.52
Copyright term—The Copyright Act of 1790 had a copyright term
of fourteen years (renewable once for a total of twenty-eight years).53
Modern copyright has a copyright term of the life of the author plus
seventy years.54
Infringing activities—The Copyright Act of 1790 prohibited only
the printing, reprinting, publishing, and selling of a protected work.55
It was not an infringement of traditional copyright to perform a work,
such as by reading it out loud in the street. Modern copyright law
makes public performance of a work an infringing act,56 in addition to
prohibiting the reproduction and selling of a protected work.57 In
this way, the most pure form of “speech”—i.e., reading something out
loud in the street—was simply not an activity that was covered by traditional copyright law at all.
Thus, based on the Framers’ enactment of the Copyright Act of
1790, one could very well argue that a copyright regime that prohibited the printing and selling of copyrighted maps, charts, and books
for fourteen years—while still allowing everyone to make public
speeches that quote from those copyrighted books and make public
displays of those copyrighted maps—would not offend the Framers’
50 See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057,
1061–62 (2001) (comparing modern copyright to the copyright regime enacted by
the Framers).
51 See Copyright Act of 1790, § 1. An 1802 amendment expanded this to include
pictures and engravings. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed
1831).
52 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
53 Copyright Act of 1790, § 1.
54 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
55 See Copyright Act of 1790, § 1.
56 17 U.S.C. § 106.
57 Id.
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conception of freedom of speech, and therefore would not offend the
First Amendment under an originalist framework. But it simply does
not follow that the Framers would regard modern copyright law as
similarly benign.58
The Court in Golan dodged these problems only by a rhetorical
trick. Instead of fairly comparing the Copyright Act of 1790 to modern copyright law, and considering all the relevant differences
between the two regimes, the Golan Court reduced the “traditional
contours of copyright protection” to two features: the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use defense.59 Implicitly, the Court is saying
that, because modern copyright law has these two features, it is irrelevant that there have been numerous other changes to copyright law
that make it far more speech-suppressive than anything the Framers
allowed.
There are at least two problems with this rhetorical trick. The
first is that it doesn’t pass the laugh test once we state its reasoning
explicitly. If the theory that the Court is going to rely on is Framers’
intent, then we should be really trying to discern the Framers’ actual
intentions, which is best demonstrated by considering all the features
of the Copyright Act of 1790 that they enacted and not a cherrypicked version.
The second problem is that, even if one were to cherry pick, one
could not pick two worse features of copyright law to ascribe to the
Framers. This is because the Copyright Act of 1790 did not have an
idea/expression dichotomy or a fair use defense.60 The idea/expression dichotomy is generally traced to Baker v. Selden61 in 1879.62 The
fair use defense is generally traced to Folsom v. Marsh63 in 1841.64
Neither concept had been articulated in American law at the time of
the ratification of the First Amendment.
58 See Lessig, supra note 50, at 1061–62.
59 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012).
60 Rudimentary versions of these concepts had been developed by that time in
British law. See Robert Yale Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a
Mass Communications World, 14 UCLA L. REV. 735, 737–38 (1967) (discussing eighteenth-century British cases that articulated the notion that ideas should be free); Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1372–73 (2011)
(discussing the British “fair abridgement” defense). But there is little evidence that
the Framers were even aware of these nascent doctrines, much less that they intended
to incorporate these British doctrines—and only these doctrines—into the First
Amendment or into the Copyright Act of 1790.
61 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879).
62 Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L.
REV. 321, 326 (1989).
63 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
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In short, if we take the Framers’ intent theory seriously and are
really looking for the actual intent of the Framers, then one would be
hard-pressed to defend modern copyright law as something that they
intended to be exempt from the First Amendment. At least, one
could not come to this conclusion based on their enactment of the
Copyright Act of 1790, which is the only piece of evidence cited by the
Supreme Court.65 Moreover, one certainly cannot say that the Framers intended a rule that says copyright law is exempt from the First
Amendment on condition of it having an idea/expression dichotomy
and a fair use defense, concepts that the Framers did not even know
about. In all these respects, the Framers’ intent theory fails to reconcile modern copyright law with the First Amendment.66
D. Does the Lack of a Theory Matter?
Does it matter that the Framers’ intent theory fails? Pragmatists
will likely say “no.” From the perspective of certainty, there is no
problem with the status quo. The bottom line of what the existing
doctrine says is fairly clear: copyright is exempt from the First Amendment, subject to the continued existence of a fair use defense and an
idea/expression dichotomy. Practicing lawyers and their clients know
what “the law” is.
Moreover, from the perspective of policy, there is at least a plausible argument that the existing doctrine achieves good outcomes. As
Nimmer explained, copyright law is a balance: we restrict some speech
in order to incentivize even more speech.67 The idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use defense together function to calibrate this
policy balance within copyright law and ensure that copyrights do not
restrict more speech than is necessary (i.e., to ensure that copyright
64 See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 876 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (crediting Folsom with creating the fair use doctrine), vacated, 545 U.S. 193
(2005); Rubin v. Bos. Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 1981) (same).
65 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 885–86 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 200–01 (2003).
66 To be clear, I am not saying that originalism, broadly defined, cannot possibly
provide a coherent defense of the copyright exemption. I am saying that the sloppy
Golan/Eldred version of originalism does not do so. Among other things, a sophisticated originalist analysis of the copyright exemption would likely eschew reliance on
Framers’ intent. See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J.
713, 721–22 (2011) (discussing the shift away from relying on Framers’ intent in modern originalist theory).
67 Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1189; see Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 990–92 (1970) (explaining the balancing of First
Amendment principles with those underlying copyright law).
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covers only “expression” and also does not restrict “fair” uses).68 As
long as copyright law retains these two policy levers and they function
properly, then it will achieve good policy outcomes.69 Therefore, the
Court’s decision to create an exemption for copyright, as well as its
decision to condition the exemption on the continued existence of an
idea/expression dichotomy and a fair use defense, are all defensible
on a policy level.
That said, it should obviously matter that the Framers’ intent theory fails, even if the outcome can be justified as a matter of policy. If
the Framers’ intent theory served no purpose—if it did not matter
whether the theory works or not—then the Court presumably would
not have bothered to invoke it in the first place. If Nimmer’s policy
argument were enough, one would not see a forest’s worth of law
review articles criticizing copyright’s exemption from the First Amendment.70 And the reason comes back to the “carve-out problem”71: if
copyright is exempt from the First Amendment merely because giving
it a carve-out achieves good policy, then every interest group will
argue that its pet cause should likewise be exempt from the First
Amendment because such an exemption will achieve good policy.72
Saying that a First Amendment carve-out can be justified merely by a
good policy result opens the door to courts engaging in free-floating
policy balancing in every case.73
What the Court needs is some objective legal principle, beyond
policy balancing, that differentiates situations where it finds a First
Amendment exemption (such as copyright) and where it does not.
This search for neutral principles is a fundamental goal of constitu-

68 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556–60 (1985)
(arguing that copyright achieves definitional balance through the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use defense).
69 Of course, this leaves the argument that the idea/expression dichotomy and
the fair use defense do not function properly, in being insufficiently protective of free
speech. See Netanel, supra note 3, at 41–42 (arguing that “[a]t the very least,” we
should “insist that copyright’s beleaguered internal safety valves actually afford adequate protection for free speech”). On why this argument does not undermine the
property theory, see infra Section IV.F.
70 See supra note 24.
71 See supra Section I.A.
72 See supra text accompanying notes 24–29.
73 See Stephen Fraser, The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law
and Its Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 51 (1998) (arguing that
the existing regime “leaves the impression that the interests found in the Bill of Rights
can be balanced away every time the price to copyright holders is too high”).
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tional law.74 The Framers’ intent theory was an attempt to provide
such an objective principle—look to what the Framers had
intended—but it fails to explain the copyright exemption because
modern copyright law, including the idea/expression dichotomy and
the fair use defense, looks nothing like what the Framers actually
enacted or could have imagined. In the rest of this Article, I provide a
different principle to explain the copyright exemption; one that does
not share the defects of the Framers’ intent theory.
II.

PRIVATE PROPERTY

AND THE

FIRST AMENDMENT

Outside of copyright law, the idea that the enforcement of private
property rights is generally not subject to First Amendment constraints is well accepted. The protestors affiliated with the Occupy
Wall Street movement would surely like to conduct their protests
inside Goldman Sachs’ headquarters. And such a protest would likely
be more effective in communicating their political message than a
protest at some other forum. But the protestors cannot protest inside
Goldman Sachs’ headquarters because there is—at least as a general
matter—no First Amendment right to trespass on private property.75
This is not only a descriptive point but is backed by strong normative considerations. Most people think it is a very good thing that
their property is not taken for the benefit of communicating other
people’s speech. At a fundamental level, a decent respect for private
property rights is essential to secure meaningful free speech opportunities for everybody.76 If Adam were allowed to take Bob’s loudspeaker (or use Bob’s front lawn, or expropriate any other type of
property) whenever it was helpful to broadcasting Adam’s message,
then Bob’s message would be correspondingly diluted. This would be
true even if Bob were not using the loudspeaker at the particular time,
74 See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 16–20 (1959) (arguing that the legitimacy of judicial review depends
on following neutral principles).
75 See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972). A case in some conceptual tension with this principle is Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, which held that
the free speech protection of the California Constitution created a right to trespass on
private property. 592 P.2d 341, 346 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). But
Pruneyard has no strong relevance to my argument because it is not a First Amendment case. To the extent that a state constitution attempted to create a right to
infringe federal copyrights, it would be trumped by the Supremacy Clause. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
76 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (“The constitutional guarantee
of liberty implies the existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy.”).
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because an audience’s attention span and information processing
capabilities are limited.77 Adam would therefore always take Bob’s
loudspeaker, while Bob would always protest on Adam’s front lawn,
and the tit-for-tat would go on forever. The result would be utter
chaos, which is no way to set up a democracy or a free speech system.
Doctrinally speaking, this normative policy goal is implemented
under the auspices of the “state action” doctrine.78 What courts hold
is that the private enforcement of property rights against protestors
and other unwanted speakers is not state action and is thus not subject
to First Amendment scrutiny.79 This is true even if the private property right must ultimately be enforced though the mechanism of a
judicially issued injunction.80 The result is that Goldman Sachs may
use its headquarters to broadcast favored messages (“banks are good”)
while excluding disfavored messages (“banks are bad”). The doctrinal
outcome therefore reflects the main principle of the property theory,
which is that the enjoyment and enforcement of private property
rights are generally not subject to First Amendment constraints.
Yet this is only a general principle, not an absolute one.81 The
property theory does not say that anything labeled “property” is always
and automatically exempt from all First Amendment scrutiny. As the
remainder of this Part will explain, under the property theory, the
exemption of private property rights from First Amendment scrutiny
77 See Eileen Hintz Rumfelt, Comment, Political Speech: Priceless—Mastercard v.
Nader and the Intersection of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 55 EMORY L.J. 389, 389
(2006) (“[T]hose with a message to convey must compete daily with thousand [sic] of
other messages . . . .”). My point here is that the owner’s actual use of the property is
not the dispositive issue. Cf. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 184 (arguing that “the
nonrivalrous aspect of intellectual property infringement weakens the property rights
argument”).
78 See David McGowan, Some Realism About the Free-Speech Critique of Copyright, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 447 (2005) (arguing copyright suits, like trespass suits, are not
state action).
79 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1976) (holding that private shopping mall may exclude union picketers).
80 One authority to the contrary is Shelley v. Kraemer, which held judicial enforcement of a racially exclusive covenant to be state action. 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). Shelley
is widely understood as a unique case prompted by the unique harms of racially exclusive covenants, and it has not been applied outside of that context. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 526 (1985) (“The
Supreme Court . . . largely has refused to apply Shelley.”).
81 See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 513 (“[E]ven truisms are not always unexceptionably
true, and an exception to this one was recognized almost 30 years ago . . . .”); cf.
Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 182 n.163 (arguing that “ ‘[t]he incantation ‘property’ seems sufficient to render free speech issues invisible’ ” (alteration in original)
(quoting Gordon, supra note 28, at 1537)).
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is subject to two caveats. First, the exemption applies only to types of
property that are content and viewpoint neutral at the systemic level.
Second, even when the exemption applies, it is not absolute: in exceptional cases, where a property owner possesses overwhelming ownership power, First Amendment scrutiny will still attach.
A. Content and Viewpoint Neutrality in the Property System
The first condition is that the government-created rules of the
property system must be neutral towards speech. At a doctrinal level,
what the property theory says is that the private enforcement of property rights is not state action subject to scrutiny under the First
Amendment. But the government’s creation of a property system in
the first place is unquestionably a matter of state action. As such, the
rules of the property system cannot discriminate on the basis of
speech.82
Examples will clarify the distinction between the government’s
creation of the rules of a property system and the individual enforcement of a private property right under those rules.83 A lawsuit filed by
Goldman Sachs against Occupy Wall Street protesters is an example of
the individual enforcement of a private property right. The fact that
Goldman Sachs is viewpoint discriminatory in its enforcement—it
only ejects speakers it does not like and does not sue speakers it does
like—is irrelevant to the First Amendment calculus. This is because
the relevant property system, which in this example is the real property
system governing the ownership of land, is content and viewpoint neutral: anyone can own land, and the owner of a piece of land can use it
to broadcast any message that he likes. At a systemic level, the rules of
the real property system do not favor particular speakers or particular
82 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (“Although this is a civil
lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law
which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms
of speech and press.”).
83 Cass Sunstein has provided a similar explanation of the distinction:
A private university, expelling students for (say) racist speech, is not a state
actor. The trespass law, which helps the expulsion to be effective, is indeed
state action. The distinction matters a great deal. The trespass law, invoked
in this context, is a content-neutral regulation of speech . . . . This . . . does
not violate the First Amendment.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 205 (1993); see also Lillian R. BeVier,
Copyright, Trespass, and the First Amendment: An Institutional Perspective, 21 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y 104, 137 (2004) (“When a judge enjoins or awards damages for an infringement
of copyright, though she is a government actor acting in her official capacity, she is
not ‘deciding to restrict speech.’ Rather . . . , she is merely . . . enforcing the copyright
owner’s ‘decision to restrict speech.’ ”).
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viewpoints. There is no rule of property law that says only banks and
their ideological supporters can own land and bring trespass actions.84
This might seem banal, in that most property regimes are neutral
towards speech at a systemic level. But this is not true of all property
regimes. A good example of a property system that is neither content
nor viewpoint neutral at a systemic level is the law of defamation,
which protects a property right in reputation.85 Although it is a property system, the rules of the defamation system favor some viewpoints
and disfavor others: defamation law only punishes criticisms that hurt
someone’s reputation; it never punishes praise that enhances reputation.86 The systematic tendency of defamation law is to mute criticism
and preserve the status quo in favor of those who are already in
power.87
This characteristic of the government-created libel law—and not
the fact that individual plaintiffs are viewpoint discriminatory in their
enforcement of that law—is the reason that defamation is subject to
First Amendment scrutiny, even though it is a privately enforced property right.88 The Supreme Court made this clear in the famous case of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,89 where it stated: “Although this is a
civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied
a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions
84 A counterargument here is that the real property system does have a systematic
bias: it gives more voice to rich people who can afford to buy more land, or better
land (e.g., close to the White House), than poor people. This is a systematic bias that
afflicts all property systems. Implicit in the Court’s general acceptance of the property theory in non-copyright contexts is the recognition that this kind of subtle wealth
bias is not sufficient to make a regime speech-discriminatory.
85 See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 693–99 (1986) (discussing the view of reputation as
property). The view of reputation as property is not without problems. See Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (holding that reputation is not property for constitutional purposes). If one takes the view that reputation is not property, then the argument that copyright law should be subject to First Amendment scrutiny can be given
short shrift, because the proponents of that argument nearly always rely on an analogy
between copyright and defamation. See Baker, supra note 11, at 905–06. In order to
have a meaningful discussion on the larger issue, I will assume for purposes of this
Article that reputation is property.
86 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
87 See Chris Williams, Comment, The Communications Decency Act and New York
Times v. Sullivan: Providing Public Figure Defamation a Home on the Internet, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 491, 494 n.15 (2010) (“Common law libel actions were the road used to
force the courts into maintaining the status quo.”).
88 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 83, at 206 (arguing that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
rests on a rejection of the lower court’s holding that “the common law of tort, and
more particularly of libel, was not state action at all”).
89 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

2013] p r o p e r t y t h e o r y o f c o p y r i g h t ’ s 1 s t a m e n d . e x e m p t i o n

541

on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press.”90 What was
being scrutinized was not the individual lawsuit, but the governmentcreated rules of defamation law. The Court reemphasized this point
again in summarizing its holding: “We hold that the rule of law applied
by the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient . . . .”91
Once we understand this difference between individual enforcement and systemic neutrality, it becomes clear that many of the critics’
arguments are misplaced. Practically every critic of the copyright
exemption bases his argument on an analogy between copyright and
defamation, because both protect a property interest.92 But the analogy draws the comparison at the wrong level of abstraction. It is true
that, at the level of individual enforcement, both liability for copyright
infringement and liability for defamation depend on the content of
an accused communication;93 but individual enforcement is not the
right level of abstraction for a First Amendment analysis.94 The First
Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting laws that abridge the
freedom of speech; it says nothing about private individuals.95 The
right level of abstraction is thus to look to the speech-abridging effects
of the congressionally enacted law—e.g., the Copyright Act of 1976,96
or the doctrine of defamation, as a whole—rather than individual lawsuits brought under such a law.97
90 Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
92 Baker, supra note 11, at 905 (“[T]he First Amendment critique of copyright
invokes New York Times Co. v. Sullivan as the most relevant analogy.” (footnote omitted)); see also Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 182–83 (relying on analogy between
libel and copyright); Netanel, supra note 3, at 41 (comparing the lack of constitutional protection for libel and analogizing to copyright); Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at
26–27 (same).
93 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 186 (arguing that copyright is not speechneutral because “liability turns on the content of what is published”).
94 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 83, at 205.
95 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
96 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810
(2006)).
97 See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1209, 1255 (2010) (arguing that a First Amendment violation depends on the law that
Congress passed and “has nothing to do with the application of the law to any particular person”). I am not endorsing Rosenkranz’s further conclusion that the First
Amendment does not apply to executive action—that conclusion contradicts existing
doctrine—but it is a well-settled feature of existing doctrine that the First Amendment
is violated only by state action. The only state action here is the congressional passage
of the Copyright Act. Under the Copyright Act, a copyright grant is automatic and
involves no executive action. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
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Libel lawsuits receive special scrutiny under the First Amendment
because the libel system—in the Supreme Court’s words, the generally
applicable “state rule of law” that comprises the doctrine of libel98—is
content and viewpoint discriminatory; not because a particular libel
lawsuit is. At the level of individual enforcement, numerous kinds of
lawsuits turn on the content of a defendant’s speech. For example, a
court that sanctions a defendant for giving evasive answers to an interrogatory request must read the content of the defendant’s response to
determine whether it is “evasive” and subject to liability.99 But nobody
suggests that motions for sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should therefore receive heightened scrutiny under the
First Amendment. Individual discovery sanctions receive no heightened First Amendment scrutiny because the civil discovery system as a
whole is content and viewpoint neutral, while libel lawsuits receive
heightened scrutiny because the libel system is content and viewpoint
discriminatory. As I shall explain in Part III, the copyright system is
like the civil discovery and real property systems, and unlike the defamation system, in being content and viewpoint neutral: anyone can
obtain a copyright for any work, regardless of its content or viewpoint,
and the copyright system gives the same protection to all works, again
regardless of their content or viewpoint.100 This difference at the systemic level explains why defamation is an inapt analogy for copyright.
A second implication of the above analysis is that Lemley and
Volokh’s nightmare hypothetical about the flag is inapt. Lemley and
Volokh argue that the property theory is obviously wrong because it
supposedly implies that Congress could declare the flag to be government property and then prosecute flag burning as criminal trespass.101 But, putting aside the obvious response that the property
theory pertains to private enforcement of private property rights, and
not government prosecution of criminal trespass to government property, a congressionally enacted statute that declared the flag and only
the flag (or only the flag and other symbols that the government
favored) to be government property and subject to protection would
not be content or viewpoint neutral.102 The property theory would
therefore not remove First Amendment scrutiny for such a statute. In
98 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
99 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4) (making an evasive or incomplete response
sanctionable).
100 See infra Section IV.B (refuting the argument that copyright is content
discriminatory).
101 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 182–83.
102 Nor would selectively enforcing a general criminal trespass law against only flag
burners and no one else—to the extent such a government prosecution policy can be
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this way, the requirement of systemic neutrality makes the property theory far more nuanced than its cavalier dismissal by the critics would
suggest.
B. Protection Against Overwhelming Ownership Power
Even when the rules of the property system are neutral, the property theory only provides a qualified exemption of private enforcement of property rights from First Amendment scrutiny. The First
Amendment will still intervene to protect free speech values when a
property owner possesses such overwhelming ownership power as to
foreclose all alternative avenues of expression.
The case that establishes this principle is Marsh v. Alabama.103 In
Marsh, a private company owned all the land in an entire town and
ran all the operations of the town. The company then forbade Jehovah’s Witnesses from distributing religious literature on its property.
In most ordinary circumstances, the company’s actions would be quite
lawful—a private property owner is generally entitled to prohibit the
advocacy of disfavored views on its property. But when a company
owns the entire town, it is difficult to ignore the practical consequence: the residents of the town would then effectively have no free
speech rights. As the Court framed the issue, the question was: “Can
those people who live in or come to Chickasaw be denied freedom of
press and religion simply because a single company has legal title to
all the town?”104
The Court’s answer was “no.” Because the company/landowner
was performing an essential public function, its ownership rights were
qualified and its exercise of those rights was subject to First Amendment limitations.105 Marsh thus establishes a First Amendment limitation on the private individual enforcement of property rights, even
when the property system at issue is content neutral. Although there
is generally no First Amendment right to trespass, in exceptional circumstances there is.
The Marsh exception is conceptually important because it refutes
the contention—central to the argument of property theory critics—
that the property theory entails a categorical, formalistic, automatic,
and unthinking exemption of anything and everything labeled “propproven—be permissible. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608–10 (1985) (recognizing a selective prosecution defense for First Amendment activity).
103 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
104 Id. at 505.
105 See id. at 506.
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erty” from First Amendment scrutiny.106 These critics aggrandize the
property theory to unreasonable extremes in order to defeat it. That
is, if the property theory meant that anything labeled “property” was
categorically exempt from First Amendment scrutiny, then it would be
so manifestly unreasonable that no one would or should subscribe to
it. But the absolutist version of the property theory is not reflective of
existing law, either as applied to copyright or in the broader fabric of
the First Amendment. In short, the critics are attacking a
strawman.107
What the Marsh exception shows is that the property theory
accommodates a balance between respect for property rights and free
speech values. One might still argue that courts are insufficiently protective of free speech values, but at that point the question becomes
one of degree, with no clear principled line on what the right balance
should be. The critics have thus far eschewed such a messy line-drawing argument in favor of portraying the property theory as accommodating no balancing at all,108 and to that extent the Marsh doctrine
refutes their argument.
A remaining counterargument is that the Marsh doctrine is so
infrequently applied that it has been de facto overruled.109 It is true
106 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 182–83 (arguing that the property theory
would allow Congress to label the flag as property); Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 27
(“The unthinking defense runs as follows. Major premise: [t]here is no First Amendment right to trample on other people’s property. Minor premise: [c]opyright is
property. Conclusion: [a] copyright infringer can have no First Amendment
defense.”); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1026, 1097 (2003) (stating that the property theory rests on an “assertion[ ] that intellectual property rules are per se proper”); see also Lawrence Lessig, Re-crafting a Public
Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56, 81 (Supp. 2006) (“The ordinary [layperson’s] view
about property is binary at its core. Limits or subtle restrictions on the scope or
strength of ‘copyright’ are not internalized within this view.”).
107 In fairness, some commentators do take the absolutist position. See James L.
Swanson, Copyright Versus the First Amendment: Forecasting an End to the Storm, 7 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 263, 265, 291–93 (1987) (arguing “we must not, under any circumstances,
recognize a First Amendment privilege to copyright” because it “[a]ttacks the
[p]roperty [r]ight [b]asis of [c]opyright [l]aw”). But my point is that the absolutist
position is not reflective of existing law. Attacking only the most extremist version of
a theory while ignoring the more reasonable version—especially when the more reasonable version reflects existing law—is attacking a strawman.
108 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 50, at 1068 (characterizing the property theory as
implying that copyright deserves “absolute and permanent protection”); Volokh,
supra note 106, at 1097 (stating that the theory implies that all intellectual property is
“per se proper”).
109 See Wayne Batchis, Business Improvement Districts and the Constitution: The Troubling Necessity of Privatized Government for Urban Revitalization, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
91, 129 (2010) (arguing that Marsh’s holding is “a virtual nullity”).
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that Marsh is infrequently applied, but there is no reason to think that
this is because its principle—that First Amendment scrutiny will attach
when a property owner possesses overwhelming power as to be able to
block all reasonable avenues of expression—lacks continuing legal
validity.110 Rather, the Marsh doctrine is not frequently applied simply because, in the tangible property context, it is intrinsically rare
that anyone will own so much land or goods as to pose this kind of
real and substantial threat to free speech.111 If Occupy Wall Street
cannot protest inside Goldman Sachs headquarters, it can protest
outside on the public street, which is only slightly less effective in
terms of communicating its message. In the context of tangible property, it takes something akin to a company town—where there is no
public sidewalk—for the threat to free speech to be a sufficiently substantial one.112
III.

APPLYING

THE

PROPERTY THEORY

TO

COPYRIGHT LAW

Part II described the First Amendment treatment of non-copyright property, from which two principles emerged. The first principle is that the private enforcement of a property right is generally
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny, provided that the government-created rules of the property system are content and viewpoint
neutral at the systemic level. The second principle is that this exemption is not absolute: in situations where a property owner possesses
overwhelming economic power and can eliminate all alternative avenues of expression, First Amendment scrutiny will still attach.
In this Part, I will show how these two principles, which together I
call the property theory, both explain and justify the current state of
the law pertaining to the relationship between the First Amendment
and copyright. Properly understood, copyright is not a “giant First
Amendment duty-free zone” where the normal principles of First
110 See Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1550 (2008) (stating that “Marsh has never been
overruled, and remnants of the Marsh approach continue to influence some corners
of free speech jurisprudence”); id. at 1577–83 (arguing that Marsh continues to influence free speech jurisprudence, including in the context of copyright).
111 See Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 28 (arguing that tangible property has intrinsic
limits, but copyright does not).
112 See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561–62 (1972) (distinguishing Marsh
because it involved a situation where, because “title to the entire town was held privately, there were no publicly owned streets, sidewalks, or parks where [free speech]
rights could be exercised”).
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Amendment jurisprudence fail to apply.113 Instead, when viewed
through the lens of the property theory, the normal principles of First
Amendment jurisprudence support both (1) exempting private
enforcement of copyright rights from First Amendment scrutiny, and
(2) conditioning this exemption on the continued existence of an
idea/expression dichotomy and a fair use defense. In other words,
the property theory provides a powerful descriptive explanation for
current law; one that is much superior to the Framers’ intent theory
that the Supreme Court has relied upon.
A. The Copyright System Is (Mostly) Content Neutral
The first principle of the property theory is that the private
enforcement of a property right (such as trespass actions for real
property) is generally exempt from First Amendment scrutiny if the
government-created rules of the property system are content and viewpoint neutral. Copyright conforms to this principle. Like real property law, copyright is content and viewpoint neutral at the systemic
level: anyone can obtain a copyright without regard to the content of
what is being protected, and the scope and duration of copyright protection does not discriminate between different types of speech. At
least since the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright protection has been
automatic114: 17 U.S.C. § 102 vests copyright protection in all works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium,115 without regard to
what the work says; and § 106 creates a neutral rule that forbids the
reproduction of a copyrighted work,116 again without regard to what
the specific work actually says. A book that criticizes the U.S. government is just as protected by copyright as a book that praises the government. Nor does the copyright system—at least generally
speaking—discriminate between different types of content: a trashy
novel or pornographic movie is protected against copying just as
much as a work of high art.117
113 Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 3; see Netanel, supra note 3, at 37 (arguing copyright currently enjoys “sui generis” treatment).
114 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (revised July 24, 1971) (forbidding formalities
and requiring automatic copyright protection).
115 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression . . . .”).
116 Id. § 106.
117 This is an overgeneralization. As I discuss in Section IV.B, the copyright system
is not completely content neutral, even at the level of the statutory enactment. See
infra text accompanying notes 181–83.
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This feature of copyright is shared by most other property systems
(e.g., personal property law forbids someone else from burning your
book, without regard to what the book says or whether the burner
intends to communicate a message by destroying your book), and not
uncoincidentally such property systems are generally exempt from
First Amendment scrutiny. But it powerfully distinguishes copyright
law from libel law—and libel law is the critics’ favorite analogy.118
Libel law, as discussed above, is neither content nor viewpoint neutral
at the systemic level.119 The rules of libel law require a challenged
statement to be “defamatory”—they only make injuring reputation
unlawful and not enhancing reputation.120 Copyright law makes all
reproduction of a protected work an infringing act,121 whether the
copying benefits the copyright owner or hurts him.122 To be sure, at a
bottom line level the results tend to have a certain similarity—copyright owners are more likely to bring suit against people who disparage their work than people who praise it—but there is a key
difference in terms of governmental action. In libel law, the discrimination between favored and disfavored speech is built into the legal
rule itself: the government mandates only criticism and not praise will be
punished. In copyright law and real property law, the discrimination
is as a result of private choices. Those choices may be somewhat predictable as a practical matter, but they are not a direct product of
government mandate.
As I will discuss in Section IV.B, the copyright system is not completely content neutral, even at the level of the statutory enactment.
Specifically, the Copyright Act delineates various carve-outs from copyright protection,123 and some of these carve-outs are content specific.
But these exceptions do not detract from the main point: the copyright statute is mostly content neutral, and the parts where it is content specific have not been the focus of the arguments against
copyright’s constitutionality. My goal is substantially met if the reader
concludes that copyright is generally constitutional, even if some of
118 See Baker, supra note 11, at 905.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 92–100.
120 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). Indeed, libel law even
picks and chooses between the types of reputation to protect. See, e.g., id. cmt. e, illus.
3 (explaining that a gang member’s reputation for loyalty to the gang is not
protected).
121 17 U.S.C. § 106.
122 With one important qualification: The doctrine of fair use grants stronger protection to criticism of a copyrighted work than to praise. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–82 (1994). On why this does not make copyright law
unconstitutional, see infra text accompanying notes 194–97.
123 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122.
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the content specific carve-outs from copyright protection might be
invalid. It is worth noting that such a conclusion would likely result in
broader copyrights, which contradicts the general thrust of First
Amendment arguments against copyright law.124
B. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy and the Fair Use Defense Serve as
Safeguards Against Overwhelming Ownership Power
Even when a property system is speech-neutral at a systemic level,
the property theory does not say that the inquiry is always at an end.
As we have seen, the First Amendment still demands that there be
some protection for free speech against overwhelming private economic power125—at least in instances where the private power is so
pervasive as to foreclose alternative avenues of expressing a particular
message. In the context of tangible property rights, this protection is
often intrinsic: it is intrinsically difficult for anyone to own enough
land or tangible property as to control all potential avenues for communicating a particular message. And because the problem of overwhelming ownership power is intrinsically unlikely to occur, the law
needs few doctrinal safeguards against it. For this reason, Marsh is a
narrow and rarely applied doctrine in the tangible property context.
Copyright is not subject to the same intrinsic limits. As Jed
Rubenfeld has observed,
A copyright owner’s power over speech applies to the public at
large, anywhere and everywhere. While a homeowner may block
certain texts from being recited on his premises, a copyright owner
can block certain texts from being published, copied, or recited by
virtually anyone, in public and often in private.126

As I will explain, Rubenfeld draws too broad a conclusion from
this observation—he concludes that “[c]opyright cannot be constitutionally justified by analogy to ordinary property law”127—but the
observation itself is correct. Unlike tangible property, copyright law
lacks intrinsic limits on its economic scope.128 And without some
124 See David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65
U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 282 (2004) (arguing that the First Amendment argument against
copyright is motivated by a concern about excessively broad copyright protection).
125 See supra Section II.B.
126 Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 29.
127 Id. at 30.
128 To use a popular phrase, there are no “[s]idewalks in [c]yberspace” to provide
readily available alternative forums for expression. Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public
Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1535 (1998); Noah D. Zatz,
Note, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the Electronic Environment,
12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 149 (1998).
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limit, private ownership power will pose an unacceptable threat to free
speech values.129
But although copyright has no intrinsic limits, it has doctrinal
limits that serve to limit the economic scope of a copyright monopoly.
The two doctrinal safeguards against excessively broad copyright
scope are well known. The first is the idea/expression dichotomy: A
copyright does not prevent other people from speaking in general, or
even talking about a copyright holder’s idea.130 It prevents only the
reproduction of the copyright holder’s particular expression of the
idea. This is not to say that copyright scope is narrowly confined to
slavish photocopying—it is not—but only to say that the idea/expression dichotomy imposes an important limit on the scope of the copyright monopoly and reduces its footprint on the ability of others to
convey a particular message.131
The second doctrinal limit is the fair use defense.132 Even with
the ability to copy the idea, sometimes it is impossible to convey a
particular political message without copying someone’s expression.
For example, if I want to criticize Professor X’s argument, it is often
impossible to do so persuasively without quoting Professor X’s words,
which in the absence of a fair use defense would be copyright
infringement.133
What emerges is that the doctrinal limits that address the concern
over excessive private ownership power are precisely those that the
Supreme Court has identified as conditions for copyright’s continued
exemption from the First Amendment. Contrary to Rubenfeld, the
analogy between copyright and ordinary property is not defeated simply by pointing to the fact that tangible property has an intrinsic limit
(i.e., nobody is likely to own enough land to be able to stifle all reasonable alternative forums for expression) while copyright does not.
All this difference means is that the law must impose some substitute
limit that performs the same function in terms of safeguarding against
excessive private ownership power. The idea/expression dichotomy
129 Jay Thomas has similarly argued that patents provide excessive private control
over liberty interests. See John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39
HOUS. L. REV. 569, 618–19 (2002).
130 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
131 See generally Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)
(Hand, J.) (discussing the difficulty that “the right cannot be limited literally to the
text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations,” but, “as soon as literal
appropriation ceases to be the test,” the limit of copyright scope becomes unclear).
132 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
133 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994) (holding
parodies to be fair use because “[p]arody needs to mimic an original to make its
point”).
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and the fair use defense perform this function, and they are thus
required by the property theory.
I should be clear what the property theory contributes here. The
notion that the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense
balance copyright incentives against the harms of excessive ownership
power—and thus serve to safeguard free speech values against excessive ownership power—is not new. This concept of “definitional balancing” was explained by Melville Nimmer in his original 1970
article,134 and has been cited numerous times by the Supreme Court
since.135 The problem has always been that Nimmer justified definitional balancing on purely results-oriented grounds: he argued that
copyright should be exempt from the First Amendment, so long as it
had an idea/expression dichotomy and a fair use defense, merely
because this setup created a good policy result.136 There is no explanation from the perspective of traditional legal theory on how this
outcome can be deduced from the ordinary principles of legal analysis.137 The Supreme Court later tried to plug this theoretical gap with
the Framers’ intent theory—supposedly the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense are the “traditional contours of copyright”—but its attempt was strikingly unconvincing.138
What the property theory contributes is a way to plug the theoretical gap. The property theory shows that conditioning copyright’s
exemption from the First Amendment on the continued existence of
an idea/expression dichotomy and a fair use defense is not unprincipled or made up from thin air. Rather, it is entirely consistent with
the principles that can be found in the broader body of First Amendment jurisprudence, which always conditions an exemption from First
Amendment scrutiny—for any form of property, including real property—on safeguards against excessive private ownership power. In
this way, the property theory provides a coherent framework to
explain why the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense
are the conditions for a First Amendment exemption. It shows that
134 Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1184, 1189–93; see Goldstein, supra note 67, at
1006–07 (arguing that the “copyright statute reflects a reasoned compromise
between” free speech values and incentives for creating new works).
135 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 219 (2003); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
556 (1985).
136 Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1192 (placing emphasis on idea/expression dichotomy to safeguard free speech values); see Goldstein, supra note 67, at 1011 (identifying fair use as an important safeguard for free speech values).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 26–29.
138 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221; see supra Section I.C.
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the Court’s doctrine in this area is not an unprincipled departure
from the greater body of First Amendment law.
A reader might ask, why the idea/expression dichotomy and fair
use defense but not other limits on copyright scope? For example,
copyright scope has long been limited by the first-sale defense,139 and
the modern copyright statute contains numerous additional specific
limits on copyright scope, such as allowing the production of copies in
specialized formats for blind people.140 But one cannot logically
derive that kind of highly specific limitation on copyright scope from
the content of existing First Amendment doctrine.141 Morse can be
quite plausibly read to stand for a general principle that there must be
some general limit on private ownership power, and limits such as the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense correspond well
to that principle.142 In contrast, the kind of highly specific rule that
comprises the first-sale doctrine cannot be logically derived from the
holding of Morse. The fact that the idea/expression dichotomy and
fair use defense are highly amorphous is usually considered a defect,
and the vague nature of these doctrines do cause many problems in
other contexts; but in terms of doctrinal fit with existing First Amendment doctrine, the flexibility of the idea/expression dichotomy and
fair use defense is an important advantage.
C. Payoffs
So what are the payoffs of applying the property theory to copyright? Initially, the payoffs are descriptive. As this Article has
explained, the property theory provides a coherent framework within
which to view the existing law. It explains both why copyright is generally exempt from First Amendment scrutiny (because it is a property
system that is content and viewpoint neutral at the systemic level), as
well as why this exemption is conditioned on the continued existence
of the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense (because
139 See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350
(1908) (recognizing the first-sale defense).
140 See 17 U.S.C. § 121. See generally id. §§ 108, 110–22 (delineating the scope of
and limitations on exclusive rights in copyrights).
141 See McGowan, supra note 124, at 284 (arguing that the First Amendment does
not contain “principles a judge could actually use to limit Congress’s power over
copyright”).
142 See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960) (describing the flexibility of the idea/expression dichotomy); William F. Patry
& Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1639, 1645 (2004) (arguing that a “redeeming feature[ ]” of fair use in solving the
problem presented by Eldred is its flexibility).
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those doctrines provide an essential safeguard against overwhelming
ownership power). In this way the property theory provides an explanation for all the major elements of the modern doctrine surrounding
the relationship between copyright law and the First Amendment.
Beyond simply providing a descriptive understanding, the property theory has an implication for the scholarly literature: it provides a
refutation of the critique that the copyright exemption is an exceptional and unprincipled carve-out from the larger body of First
Amendment jurisprudence. What the property theory illustrates is
that, properly understood, courts have not treated copyright as a
“giant First Amendment duty-free zone”143 and have not given it “sui
generis” treatment.144 Instead, copyright has been subject to the same
limitations as any other system of property.
Another important point here is that the property theory is not
the absolutist copyright-expanding theory that its critics suppose. As I
have explained, the property theory does in fact have internal limits
that protect free speech interests. This is important because it holds
out some potential for reconciliation between the opposing viewpoints in this debate.145 At a fundamental level, the critics’ ultimate
position does not appear to be that all copyright protection is categorically unconstitutional (a position that really is incompatible with the
property theory), but only that existing law strikes the balance too
much in favor of copyright holders.146 Nothing in the property theory, however, dictates that copyright protection must be broad. The
fact that judges have applied the property theory in a copyrightexpanding manner says more about the ideological leanings of the
current federal judiciary than it does about the property theory—
judges who are ideologically inclined towards broad copyright holder
rights can reach that outcome whatever the formal level of scrutiny.147
If the ultimate goal of those attacking the property theory is to achieve
143 Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 3.
144 Netanel, supra note 3, at 37.
145 See Hanoch Dagan, Property and the Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 84, 84
(2006) (observing that “[f]riends of the public domain are typically suspicious of
property-talk,” but arguing they should not be).
146 See Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 529, 530–31 (2000) (arguing expansion of intellectual property rights
strains their “uneasy truce” with the First Amendment); Lessig, supra note 50, at 1062,
1070–73 (arguing modern copyright is too strong); Netanel, supra note 3, at 13
(“[T]oday’s capacious copyright bears scant resemblance to the narrowly tailored,
short-term right in force when Nimmer wrote his article.”).
147 Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(accusing majority of surreptitiously watering-down the strict scrutiny test).
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narrower copyright rights,148 then my analysis suggests that they are
aiming at the wrong target.
To be sure, there are two differences between the property theory
and the critics’ preferred approach. The first difference is the relevant legalistic label. My approach uses the internal doctrines of copyright law to modulate the balance between private ownership and free
speech values, while the critics would generally prefer to use something external to copyright law—such as direct application of First
Amendment scrutiny—to do so.149 Although this is largely a labeling
difference, the labels do matter, and they lead to the second difference: as a practical and political matter, courts are likely to be more
protective of copyright owners if the inquiry is done under the internal rubric of the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use,150 while
they are likely to be more protective of free speech values if the
inquiry is done under the external rubric of strict scrutiny. This is
because there is a subtle shift of the mental baseline: framing the issue
under the rubric of copyright law naturally presents free speech policy
concerns as a limited exception to more general copyright rights,
while framing the issue under the rubric of First Amendment law naturally presents copyright policy concerns (e.g., the need for incentives
to create new works) as a limited exception to more general free
speech values.151
But while there is a rhetorical and political difference, there is no
logical difference between the two framings. At bottom, both
approaches accommodate a balance between copyright policy concerns and free speech policy concerns. And if the critique of the
property theory is no longer based on logic and principle but is
instead solely about the likely political effects, then much of the force
of the critique dissipates.

148 See McGowan, supra note 124, at 281–83 (suggesting that proponents of First
Amendment scrutiny are primarily motivated by the perception that “Congress is simply a tool rich media conglomerates use to soak consumers”).
149 Wendy Gordon has previously made a similar point, in arguing for
“develop[ing] limits for intellectual property, and concomitant protections for
expressive activity, that are internal to the definition of property rights themselves.”
Gordon, supra note 28, at 1607. Her approach, however, relies on a highly detailed
(and highly contested) natural law theory of intellectual property rights, which this
Article eschews. See id. at 1535.
150 See Netanel, supra note 3, at 12–23 (calling the protection offered by the fair
use defense and the idea/expression dichotomy “[i]ncreasingly [t]enuous”).
151 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874–75
(1987) (discussing how the choice of baseline affects legal analysis).

554

notre dame law review

IV.

[vol. 89:2

ADDRESSING OBJECTIONS

A. Copyright Is Not Property
The most frequent objection that I have received from commentators is that copyright should not be considered “property,” and thus
comparing copyright to the First Amendment treatment of tangible
property is misguided. Given that there is a longstanding debate
among property theorists over whether copyright should be considered property,152 my assumption on this point may appear to be an
unsubstantiated leap of logic.
My response is that I assume copyright is property because the
proponents of copyright’s unconstitutionality generally make the
same assumption. And this assumption is crucial to their argument.
Without the assumption that copyright is property, the conventional
argument against copyright’s constitutionality cannot be sustained.
This requires some explanation. As a predicate matter, it is
important to understand that the conventional argument against copyright’s constitutionality is doctrinal in nature. The argument is that
copyright is unconstitutional under the letter of standard First
Amendment doctrine, not its underlying policy rationale.153 Jed
Rubenfeld explicitly acknowledges this facet of his argument,154 but it
is implicit in those of other critics as well. For example, Lemley and
Volokh argue that copyright is content discriminatory and thus should
be subject to strict scrutiny, invoking the doctrinal rule that content
discriminatory laws are subject to strict scrutiny.155 But they do not
look to the underlying policy rationale for this rule; doing so would
undermine their argument. The policy rationale for the rule that
content discriminatory laws are subject to strict scrutiny is that it serves
as a prophylactic measure against the possibility of viewpoint discrimination—once the government looks at the content of a communication, it might then be able to protect favored views and censor
152 For some entries in this enormous literature, see, for example, Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
108 (1990); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031 (2005); Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29
(2005); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007).
153 See Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 58–59 (“I make no claim about whether this
result would be good or bad policy. The result is not supposed to follow from policy
considerations. It is supposed to follow from constitutional considerations . . . .”).
154 See id.
155 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 185–86.
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disfavored views.156 But even Lemley and Volokh acknowledge that
copyright is not viewpoint discriminatory,157 so if the argument
depended on underlying policy, there would be little reason to find
copyright unconstitutional. The critics’ argument is that one should
follow the black letter rule without ad hoc policy analysis,158 because
doing otherwise creates an unprincipled and results-oriented carveout that invites every special interest group to make policy arguments
supporting their own little pet carve-outs.159 This is what the critics
mean when they criticize “[c]opyright [e]xceptionalism.”160
I fully agree with this doctrine-based approach. Not only is a First
Amendment policy analysis prone to interest group lobbying concerns, in the context of copyright’s constitutionality it also runs
straight into a theoretical and empirical impasse. In a policy debate,
the argument against copyright’s constitutionality ultimately must be
that—as a matter of first principles and without piggybacking on doctrine—copyright law violates the “correct” free speech balance
between authorial incentives to create original speech and subsequent
access to that speech.161 The argument in favor of copyright’s constitutionality must likewise ultimately be that current copyright law
reflects the “correct” balance or falls within some zone of congres156 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 456 (1998) (“[T]he Court uses content-discrimination as
a proxy for what may be its ultimate concern: regulations that strike at speech because
it expresses a disfavored view.”); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55
U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 198–200 (1988) (arguing that the Court imposes heightened
scrutiny for content discrimination because a content-based measure “is too likely to
have been influenced by the legislature’s hostility to the speech in question”).
157 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 186 (“It’s true that copyright law draws
no ideological distinctions . . . .”).
158 See id. (emphasizing that content discrimination, even without viewpoint discrimination, is enough to violate First Amendment doctrine).
159 See id. at 198 (“Exempting restrictions such as copyright law—which is largely
identified with rich and powerful interests—from the ‘normal’ rules of the First
Amendment throws the legitimacy of free speech protection into question.”); see also
supra text accompanying notes 24–29 (collecting arguments against copyright
exceptionalism).
160 Bohannan, supra note 27, at 1115–16; see also Gordon, supra note 28, at 1537
(arguing First Amendment law should “subject intellectual property to the same free
speech principles” as apply elsewhere); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 197–98
(arguing “[a]gainst [s]pecial [p]leading for [c]opyright”).
161 One can short-circuit the empirical problems by arguing that the constitutionally mandated balance is to permit no restriction on subsequent access whatsoever.
But one would need a very ambitious (and I think implausible) theory of constitutional interpretation to reach that conclusion.
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sional discretion.162 The theoretical questions are daunting because
one’s views about how to define the “correct” balance (and the zone
of congressional discretion, if any) depend on one’s theory of constitutional interpretation, which is a source of perennial disagreement.
The empirical questions are practically impossible to resolve because
nobody really knows even what the real-world balance in today’s copyright regime is,163 let alone what the balance would look like in a
counter-factual world with stronger First Amendment scrutiny. Given
these unresolved predicates, the policy argument is unlikely to be
resolved anytime soon. The only analytically sound argument that can
be made against copyright’s constitutionality, given the existing state
of knowledge, is one based on doctrine.164
Given the doctrinal premise,165 the critics of copyright’s constitutionality must assume that copyright is property. As a matter of doctrine, the status of copyright as property is well settled.166 It is true
that property scholars continue to debate the question as a matter of
theory and policy. But the critics of copyright’s constitutionality cannot make free-floating arguments based on theory and policy—at least
not without contradicting the premise of their main argument.
162 See Nimmer, supra note 19, at 1192 (“I would conclude that the idea-expression line represents an acceptable definitional balance . . . .”).
163 See Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J.
ECON. PERSP. 57, 59 (2005) (“[E]conomists do not know whether the existing system
of intellectual property rights is . . . a source of net social utility . . . .”); George L.
Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung,
in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 19, 21 (John Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr.
eds., 1986) (describing “[t]he inability of economists to resolve the question of
whether activity stimulated by the patent system or other forms of protection of intellectual property enhances or diminishes social welfare”).
164 I admit to some status quo bias here. Like the policy case against copyright’s
constitutionality, the policy case in favor of copyright’s constitutionality also depends
on unresolved theoretical and empirical predicates. But I think it reasonable to say
that those who wish to change existing doctrine based on a policy argument would
bear the burden of proof.
165 Lemley and Volokh are hardly alone in implicitly assuming the correctness of
doctrine. Virtually every critic invokes New York Times v. Sullivan without conducting a
first-principles analysis of its correctness. See Baker, supra note 11, at 905.
166 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127–28 (1932) (holding that copyright is private property of the owner and not an instrumentality of the United
States); Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983) (“An interest in a copyright
is a property right protected by the due process and just compensation clauses of the
Constitution.”); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (analogizing copyright infringement to breaking and entering, and stating that neither activity is privileged by the First Amendment); Lessig, supra note 106, at 80
(acknowledging that “in the United States, there is no ambiguity about whether copyright is property”).
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Procedural objections aside, I have no substantive objection to an
argument that copyright should not be considered property as a matter of free-floating theory and policy. The debate over whether copyright is property is far too complex for me to resolve here. My point is
purely about consistency. If a critic argues that copyright is not property based on first principles (and contrary to standard doctrine),
then that critic must also argue that copyright is unconstitutional
based on first principles, without piggybacking on standard doctrine.
Given the numerous theoretical and empirical quagmires, I do not
believe the latter argument has been convincingly made.
There is one final point to add. Even if one believes, as a matter
of first principles, that copyright ought not be considered property,
my argument is still important because it provides a limited defense of
judges and their actions. If the only objection to my analysis is that
copyright should not be considered property, then the failure of
courts to apply strict scrutiny to copyright law is, at most, an understandable mistake: courts think that copyright is property and accordingly exempt it from First Amendment scrutiny, when the “best”
theoretical answer is that copyright is not property. This is a far cry
from how the literature usually portrays the issue, which is that judges
are engaging in an inexplicable, aberrational, and clearly wrong carveout from the First Amendment, and that the obvious inference is that
they are doing so at the behest of rich copyright-holding interests.167
At an absolute minimum, my analysis shows that the property theory is
not a “non sequitur” and is a reasonable (if normatively contestable)
argument, and that the literature’s cavalier dismissal of it is therefore
unwarranted.
B. Copyright Is Content Based
A common argument among critics of the First Amendment
exemption for copyright is that copyright law is content based, and
content-based restrictions are generally subject to strict scrutiny.168
What these critics generally mean is that copyright enforcement is content based. As Lemley and Volokh explain the argument, the key is
167 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 198 (“Exempting restrictions such as
copyright law—which is largely identified with rich and powerful interests—from the
‘normal’ rules of the First Amendment throws the legitimacy of free speech protection into question.”).
168 See, e.g., id. at 206 (“[I]ntellectual property rights, unlike other property rights,
are a form of content-based, government-imposed speech restriction.”); Rubenfeld,
supra note 2, at 5 (“[A] core doctrinal premise of modern First Amendment law is
that content-based speech restrictions must satisfy strict scrutiny.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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that “[c]opyright liability turns on the content of what is
published.”169
It is true that, at the level of individual enforcement, copyright
liability turns on the content of what is published. Specifically,
infringement liability is usually determined by looking to whether the
content of what is published by the accused infringer is substantially
similar to what was originally published by the copyright holder.170
But, as previously explained,171 the level of individual private enforcement is not the correct level of abstraction to judge compliance with
the First Amendment.172 The First Amendment prohibits only Congress from enacting laws that abridge the freedom of speech. An individual copyright grant, or an individual copyright enforcement
lawsuit, is not a “law” passed by Congress. Because copyright grants
are automatic,173 the creation and enforcement of an individual copyright involves no state action;174 the state action occurs only in the
passage of the Copyright Act of 1976. And, as explained above, the
Copyright Act of 1976 is generally not content or viewpoint
discriminatory.175
Critics who analogize the copyright statute’s prohibition on copying to more typical content-based laws (such as laws against obscenity
169 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 186; see Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 5 (giving
an enforcement-based example that “[y]ou cannot begin to tell if The Wind Done Gone
infringes without reading it, understanding it, and comparing its content to that of
Gone with the Wind”).
170 See Nova Design Build, Inc. v. Grace Hotels, LLC, 652 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir.
2011) (“Because direct evidence of the copying of protectable elements of a copyrighted work is usually unavailable, copying may be inferred where the ‘defendant
had access to the [plaintiff’s] work and the [putatively infringing] work is substantially
similar to the [plaintiff’s] work.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Incredible Techs.,
Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 2005))); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc.
v. Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1994) (“As direct evidence of
copying is uncommon, plaintiffs generally demonstrate copyright infringement indirectly or inferentially by proving that (1) defendants had access to the copyrighted
works, and (2) there is a substantial similarity between infringed and infringing
works.”).
171 See supra Section III.A.
172 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 83, at 205; cf. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663, 669 (1991) (stating that copyright law is a “generally applicable law[ ]” that does
“not offend the First Amendment simply because [its] enforcement against the press
has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news”).
173 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006) (establishing that copyright subsists automatically from the creation of a work).
174 In this respect, copyright law differs crucially from patent law. The issuance of
an individual patent does involve state action. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 131, 153 (2006) (providing for individualized examination and issuance of patents).
175 See supra Section III.A.
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or defamation) are missing an important conceptual difference
between these two categories. A law that broadly prohibits copying is
neutral as to the content of what is being copied.176 A law that prohibits obscenity or defamation is not. One literally cannot know whether
something is obscene or injurious to reputation without actually viewing its content.177 In contrast, one can, at least in theory, know that
copying has occurred without considering the content of what is being
copied. For example, if a defendant photocopies a page of a book,
copying has occurred—and we know this to be the case even without
knowing the content of what has been copied.178 A law that prohibits
copying is therefore content neutral at the level of the legal prohibition. And the copyright statute is such a law because it forbids the
copying of nearly179 everything that has been fixed in a tangible
medium in at least the last seventy years.180 The copyright statute
does not merely prohibit the copying of my work; it prohibits the copying of all works. The fact that individual instances of copyright
enforcement usually ask a more content-specific question (whether my
work has been copied) is beside the point.
One qualification to what I have said above is that, even at the
level of the copyright statute, copyright law in fact does make distinc176 It is true that a law prohibiting copying still has an influence on the proverbial
“marketplace” for speech, in that overall it pushes the market towards some kinds of
expression (original expression) and away from others (repetition of prior expression). But this does not make a law “content discriminatory” in the relevant sense,
because virtually every law has that effect: a law against loud sounds will push the
marketplace away from some kinds of expression (rock concerts) and not others.
177 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (articulating the standard for obscenity as “I know it when I see it”).
178 Rubenfeld concedes that “perfect reproduction can be demonstrated without
anyone understanding the speech in question.” Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 49. But
he argues that imperfect reproduction cannot. Id. This is wrong: both perfect and
imperfect reproduction can be demonstrated without anyone understanding the
speech in question. For example, a photocopier with insufficient toner will produce
an imperfect copy, but one does not need to see the content of the resulting copy to
realize it is derived from the original.
179 It is true that the copyright law does not forbid absolutely all copying. But the
exception is that copyright law permits copying of ideas and fair uses. See Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir.
1977) (“When the court . . . refers to ‘copying’ which is not itself an infringement, it
must be suggesting copying merely of the work’s idea, which is not protected by the
copyright.”). As I will explain below, the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
defense cannot render copyright law unconstitutional. See infra text accompanying
notes 189–93.
180 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006) (establishing copyright protection against reproduction of the work); id. § 302 (setting duration of copyright as the life of author plus
seventy years).
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tions based on content. The clearest examples are the moral rights
provisions, which grant works of visual art special protection against
changes that are prejudicial to the author’s honor or reputation.181
Content-specific distinctions are also drawn in delineating the various
limitations on copyright rights, such as 17 U.S.C. § 110’s exemption
relating to the performance or display of copyrighted works for teaching purposes,182 and § 115’s and § 116’s exemptions relating to nondramatic musical works.183 These are content-based differences—one
cannot determine whether something is related to “teaching content”184 or a “dramatic”185 musical work, or whether a change will be
prejudicial to the author’s “honor or reputation,”186 without looking
to the content of the work and the allegedly infringing use.187 But
these are not the kinds of content discrimination that the critics have
in mind. Nobody argues that copyright law is broadly unconstitutional because of these relatively esoteric provisions. When the critics
argue that copyright violates the First Amendment because it is a content-based restriction, they are really pointing to the feature that
“[c]opyright liability turns on the content of what is published.”188
And this argument misses the mark, because it only proves individual
enforcement is content specific, and not the copyright law enacted by
Congress.
A second, perhaps more important, qualification is that the copyright statute is not quite a blanket prohibition on all copying of all
works fixed in a tangible medium.189 Rather, the copyright statute
181 See id. § 106A(a)(3).
182 Id. § 110(2)(B).
183 Id. § 115 (2006 & Supp. V); id. § 116 (2006).
184 Id. § 110(2)(B).
185 Id. § 115 (2006 & Supp. V); id. § 116 (2006).
186 Id. § 106A(a)(2), (3)(A).
187 This may be an overly generous concession on my part. There is a great deal
of literature that argues that the Court’s test for content discrimination is incoherent.
See Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 113, 113 (1981) (content discrimination doctrine is “both theoretically questionable and difficult to apply” (footnote omitted)); Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 205–06 (1982); Susan H. Williams,
Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 620 (1991)
(“[C]ontent discrimination is not one concept but many.”). One can therefore make
a plausible argument that no part of copyright law flunks this incoherent test.
188 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 186; Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 5 n.17
(quoting Lemley and Volokh).
189 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression . . . .”).
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expressly permits the copying of ideas190 and other fair uses of copyrighted works.191 Both the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair
use defense are content discriminatory: one cannot tell whether something is an “idea” or an “expression” without knowing its content, nor
can one tell whether a use is “fair” without knowing the content of the
use.192 The fact that the copyright statute explicitly distinguishes
between unprotected ideas and fair uses, on the one hand, and protected expression and unfair uses, on the other, makes it content discriminatory on its face. And, unlike the esoteric provisions discussed
previously, the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense
are central concepts in modern copyright law.193 They cannot be dismissed as de minimus violations.
But the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense cannot be what make the copyright statute unconstitutional under the
First Amendment. The speech-protective content discrimination that
occurs under the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense
is generally understood to be compelled by the First Amendment.194
Compliance with the First Amendment cannot itself be the cause of a
law’s unconstitutionality; otherwise the First Amendment becomes a
catch-22. For this reason, nobody to my knowledge has ever argued
that the idea/expression dichotomy is what makes copyright law
unconstitutional.
190 See id. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea . . . .”).
191 See id. § 107.
192 Id. § 107(2)–(3) (considering “the nature of the copyrighted work” and the
“substantiality” of the copying).
193 See Sag, supra note 60, at 1371 (“The fair use doctrine is a central part of modern copyright law . . . .”); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 119, 119 (1991) (describing the idea/expression dichotomy as “the central limit on the extent of copyright protection”).
194 See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012). Although it is most explicitly
stated in Golan, the understanding that the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair
use defense are compelled by the Constitution long predates that case. See Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (stating that the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense serve as “First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act[ ]”); see also Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S.
887, 892 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Serious First Amendment questions would
be raised if Congress’ power over copyrights were construed to include the power to
grant monopolies over certain ideas.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
726 n.* (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that copyright law has no relevance
to a First Amendment dispute because “the [g]overnment . . . is seeking to suppress
the ideas expressed”); Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911) (upholding
copyright law against constitutional challenge because “there is no attempt to make a
monopoly of the ideas expressed”).
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Jed Rubenfeld does make this argument with respect to the fair
use defense.195 But Rubenfeld’s article illustrates precisely what is
wrong with the argument: short of abolishing copyright altogether,
any kind of free speech solution will do almost exactly the same thing
as the fair use defense and have the same defect. For example, after
criticizing the fair use defense, Rubenfeld proposes a test that would
find “pirated” uses to be copyright infringement but not “reimagined”
works incorporating new content.196 But this distinction between slavish piracy and imaginative new creation is strikingly similar to what the
Supreme Court has already dubbed the “central” inquiry of fair use
analysis: whether an accused work is “transformative” and “adds something new” to the prior copyrighted work.197 And one cannot determine whether something is “reimagined” without knowing its
content—unless “reimagined” simply means independent creation—
so Rubenfeld’s own proposed test is content discriminatory.198 In
short, Rubenfeld cannot argue that fair use doctrine is unconstitutional without arguing that his own proposal is as well. This is merely
an illustration of the broader point: if the kind of speech-protective
content discrimination that occurs under the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense makes copyright law unconstitutional,
then the First Amendment becomes a catch-22. And if these two doctrines are put aside, then the copyright statute is content neutral at
the systemic level.
The same logic also provides a rebuttal to an argument that the
copyright statute is unconstitutionally content discriminatory because
its protection is limited to “original” works.199 I have already
explained above why copyright law’s prohibition on copying is not
content discriminatory,200 but the originality requirement not only
requires non-copying but also requires a minimal degree of creativity.201 The creativity requirement is content discriminatory because
whether a work is creative cannot be judged without reference to its
content. However, because the originality requirement is constitu195 See Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 17.
196 Id. at 48–49, 55.
197 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The Court relies
on the distinction to hold that parodies and criticisms of an original work are more
likely to be transformative and thus more likely to be fair. See id. at 580–82. Yet this is
the precise feature of fair use doctrine that Rubenfeld criticizes. See Rubenfeld, supra
note 2, at 17.
198 Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 55 (proposing that courts compare the two works
to determine if the differences are “[t]rivial or obvious”).
199 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
200 See supra text accompanying notes 176–80.
201 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
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tionally mandated by Article I, Section 8, Clause 8,202 it once again
follows that this cannot be what renders copyright law problematic
under the First Amendment. If the First Amendment prohibited Congress from discriminating in favor of original works, then Congress
could not pass any copyright statute at all (or could do so only under
strict scrutiny): a copyright statute that contained an originality
requirement would violate the First Amendment, while a copyright
statute that did not would violate Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.
C. Copyright Is Content Neutral and Subject to Intermediate Scrutiny
A variation of the prior counterargument is that even if copyright
law is content neutral, it is still a law about speech and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny under United States v. O’Brien.203 I have
two responses to this argument.
The first is that there is very little doctrinal support for the proposition that O’Brien-type intermediate scrutiny applies to laws granting private property rights, as opposed to regulations of a more direct
nature.204 The facts of O’Brien itself concern a law banning the
destruction of draft cards, and while it may be argued that a physical
draft card is government property, there is no plausible argument that
O’Brien concerned any property interest in the expressive conduct at
issue (i.e., the act of burning the draft card). More generally, all manner of uncontroversial private property rights are plausibly characterized as being “about” speech, yet attract no constitutional scrutiny.
For example, the common law doctrine of nuisance effectively grants
a limited property right over one’s neighbor’s speech, in that it prohibits the neighbor from speaking too loudly,205 yet no one argues
202 Id. at 346 (“Originality is a constitutional requirement.”).
203 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see Netanel, supra note 3, at 54–69.
204 Except for the fact that it might be considered to be part of the issue being
analyzed (and therefore its correctness need not be taken as a given), the Supreme
Court’s decision in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483
U.S. 522 (1987) would be dispositive of this point. In that case, the Court held that
“Congress’ decision to grant the USOC a limited property right in the word ‘Olympic’
falls within the scope of trademark law protections, and thus certainly within constitutional bounds.” Id. at 534 (emphasis added). The Court did not apply intermediate
scrutiny, and this would seem to indicate that such scrutiny does not apply to intellectual property rights about speech.
205 Cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 25–26 (arguing that “[o]rdinary property law
raises no First Amendment problem because it does not render people liable for
speaking”). Contrary to Rubenfeld, nuisance liability does precisely this. See Christie
v Davey, [1893] 1 Ch. 316 (U.K.) (finding that it was a nuisance to intentionally play
loud music to annoy neighbor).
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that common law nuisance is subject to intermediate scrutiny.206 In
contrast, a more direct governmental regulation with a substantially
similar effect, such as a city ordinance banning loud music in residential neighborhoods, is subject to O’Brien-type intermediate scrutiny.207
The case can therefore be plausibly made that O’Brien does not apply
to content neutral laws granting private property rights, even if they
could be characterized as laws “about” speech.
The second response is that, even assuming O’Brien-type intermediate scrutiny applies, copyright law satisfies it. At face value, the
O’Brien test is quite demanding, requiring that a law be: (1) “justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech,”208 (2) “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,”209 and (3)
“leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.”210 For the reasons explained previously, copyright law
clearly satisfies (1) and (3), in that it is justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech and does leave open alternative
avenues for communication. However, the requirement of narrow tailoring might be thought to pose problems if applied strictly. That is,
although the promotion of “Progress” surely counts as a significant
governmental interest,211 it would be difficult to maintain based on
the existing empirical evidence that copyright law is “narrowly tailored” to serve this interest,212 if we adopted the same standards for
narrow tailoring as the Court generally demands in, say, the sex discrimination context.213
In practice, however, “narrow tailoring” under O’Brien is far less
demanding than in virtually any other area.214 The burden of proof is
effectively placed on the challengers to show that a challenged law is
206 For a general discussion of the analogy between nuisance and intellectual
property, see Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L.
REV. 61 (2009).
207 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789–801 (1989).
208 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
212 Priest, supra note 163, at 21.
213 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (requiring an “exceedingly persuasive justification” (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982))).
214 Netanel, supra note 3, at 55 (noting that “courts applying the test generally give
considerable deference to government regulation” and “the test appears to prohibit
only gratuitous inhibitions of speech”).
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overbroad and not narrowly tailored.215 Copyright’s challengers will
have an extremely difficult time meeting this burden, precisely
because nobody really knows what the optimal balance between
authorial incentives and free subsequent use lies.216 Given the
extremely deferential nature of the O’Brien test as it has been generally applied, it is a mere matter of semantics whether copyright law is
said to be subject to no scrutiny at all, or whether it is subject to scrutiny but always passes.217
D. Copyright Is Nonrivalrous
Another argument that the conventional literature has made
against the property theory is that copyright is nonrivalrous.218 The
argument is that violations of copyright do not cause the same degree
of injury to the owner as violations of tangible property rights, because
a violation of copyright does not deprive the owner of his use of the
underlying work.219
At bottom, it is difficult to understand this argument as anything
other than a covert argument that copyright is not really property.220
215 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 801–02 (1989) (rejecting the
challengers’ argument that the law was not narrowly tailored because challengers produced no evidence of “material impact” on their ability to communicate); see also
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) (dismissing argument that regulation was insufficiently narrowly tailored by stating that it represents
“no more than a disagreement with the Park Service over how much protection the
core parks require or how an acceptable level of preservation is to be attained”).
216 See supra text accompanying notes 161–63.
217 Netanel, supra note 3, at 55 (“From a practical standpoint, if ‘intermediate
scrutiny’ were applied to copyright law with similar laxity, it might not much matter
whether copyright were deemed to constitute content-neutral regulation or simply to
fall outside the First Amendment scheme.”). Netanel resists the conclusion by arguing that more rigorous scrutiny is applied when Congress acts with an improper
motive. Id. at 59. This argument is contradicted by O’Brien itself. The legislative
history in O’Brien makes clear that Congress had an illicit protest-suppressing motive
in prohibiting the destruction of draft cards. Dean Alfange, Jr., Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15. Yet the Court
expressly declined to consider this motive and applied a highly deferential test. See
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–83 (1968).
218 See Bohannan, supra note 27, at 1123–24; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at
184.
219 See Bohannan, supra note 27, at 1124 (arguing “copyright infringement ordinarily does not cause harm by dispossessing the copyright holder of her property”);
Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 184 (“Generally speaking, writing graffiti on someone else’s building damages the building owner in a different way than making a copy
of a book injures the author.”).
220 I say “covert” because the critics almost always argue that this point stands even
if copyright is considered property. See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 27, at 1083
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My response to the argument is thus the same: it contradicts the doctrinal premise of the debate.221 There is no generally recognized First
Amendment doctrinal rule that nonrivalrous forms of property should
receive less protection than other forms of property.222 The general
rule in constitutional law is that intellectual property is treated the
same as other forms of property, notwithstanding its nonrivalrous
nature.223
What the critics are really making is a policy argument that the
doctrine should be changed, and an exception to the standard rules
of the First Amendment should be made for copyright, because violations of nonrivalrous copyright property impose less severe harms
than violations of rivalrous property. There is nothing intrinsically
wrong with this policy argument, but it is not logically consistent with
the critics’ other doctrinally based arguments. If the critics want a
debate about doctrine, they must discard the copyright-is-nonrivalrous
argument. Alternatively, if the critics want a policy debate, they must
discard all the arguments that take existing doctrine as an implicit
premise—such as assuming that content discrimination should be
subject to strict scrutiny, that New York Times v. Sullivan is correctly
(“[T]he fact that copyrights are in some sense property does not justify their aberrant
treatment.”); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 184 (recognizing that the logical
implication of the argument is that copyright is not property, but arguing—without
elaboration—that “[w]hether or not that’s correct, the nonrivalrous aspect of intellectual property infringement weakens the property rights argument”).
221 See supra Section IV.A. There is one way to understand the argument without it
being inconsistent with the doctrinal premise of the debate: The critics may be making a preemptive reply to a hypothetical pro-copyright argument that, even if copyright law is subject to strict scrutiny, it passes such scrutiny because it serves a
compelling interest. At that point, an argument that copyright infringement causes
no real harm has doctrinal relevance. But, if this is the argument, then it is not an
objection to my analysis, because the property theory denies that copyright should be
subject to strict scrutiny in the first place.
222 Lemley and Volokh cite a single case, Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282,
289 (5th Cir. 1998), as supporting their argument. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at
184 & n.174. However, soon after the publication of their article, the en banc Fifth
Circuit overruled that decision. See Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 180 F.3d 674, 675
(5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
223 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (holding that
“intangible property rights protected by state law are deserving of the protection of
the Taking Clause”); Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (“A patent
for an invention is as much property as a patent for land.”); Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d
934, 939 (2d Cir. 1983) (“An interest in a copyright is a property right protected by
the due process and just compensation clauses of the Constitution.”); see also Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (analogizing copyright infringement to
breaking and entering, and stating that neither activity is privileged by the First
Amendment).
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decided, and that injunctions against speech ought to be prohibited.224 And they must also address Nimmer’s argument that the current treatment of copyright is wise because copyright incentives are
necessary for the greater public good.225 The point is that it is a mistake of logic to oscillate between a doctrinal argument and a policy
argument in the same article.
E. Congress Can Game the Exemption
A third common counterargument to the property theory is that
recognizing a First Amendment exemption for private enforcement of
property rights allows Congress to game the system.226 Lemley and
Volokh give the example of a law making the U.S. flag copyrighted in
order to prohibit flag burning.227
But my argument is not that courts do or should mechanically
exempt anything that Congress labels as “copyrighted” from First
Amendment scrutiny. My point is that courts should (and do) exempt
private enforcement of property rights from First Amendment scrutiny only when (1) the property system is content and viewpoint neutral; and (2) there is sufficient accommodation for alternative avenues
of expression on a case-by-case basis. A law that specifically protects
the U.S. flag would not be content or viewpoint neutral. Moreover,
there would be no accommodation of alternative forums for expression, since presumably the whole point of such a law is to suppress the
message of would-be flag burners. In short, the property theory has
some inbuilt protections against the potential for congressional
gamesmanship.
To be sure, these inbuilt protections are not perfect. But at that
point the objection proves too much. Congress can equally game the
exemption of tangible property from the First Amendment by vesting
physical property in the hands of favored groups (e.g., by gifting the
grounds surrounding the Capitol to political allies who then enforce
224 I do not mean that a critic cannot ever rely on these propositions. I mean that,
before doing so, a critic must first establish that the propositions are the correct interpretation of the First Amendment as a matter of first principles; he cannot take them
as established merely because they have been pronounced by the Supreme Court.
225 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
226 See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 33–34 (arguing that under the property theory
“any interest can be reconceptualized as a property interest to defeat a speech claim”
(citing Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 5, at 2445–46)); Volokh, supra note 106, at
1096–97 (portraying the property theory as asserting “that intellectual property rules
are per se proper”).
227 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 182–83; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 399 (1989) (holding flag burning to be constitutionally protected speech).
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trespass actions against protesters).228 If the potential for congressional gaming is sufficient to justify strict First Amendment scrutiny of
private property rights enforcement, then the logical implication is to
strictly scrutinize the enforcement of ordinary trespass laws for tangible property as well. For obvious reasons, no critic is prepared to
defend such a proposal, and in fact they run away from it like the
plague.229 But there is no principled distinction between tangible and
intangible property in their potential for gaming. The potential for
congressional gaming thus does not serve as a justification for subjecting copyright to more stringent First Amendment treatment than
other forms of property.
F. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Fair Use Defense
Are Currently Inadequate
Another objection to my argument is that, even assuming the
property theory is correct that the idea/expression dichotomy and the
fair use defense are intended to serve as safeguards against overwhelming economic power, they currently fail in that role.230 Given
this, the argument goes, the First Amendment needs to impose additional constraints on copyright to meet the property theory’s own
requirements.231
The answer to this objection is that it is not really a doctrinal
argument about the property theory, but a policy argument about the
desirable level of free speech protection. That is, one cannot say that
the current level of protection for free speech is inadequate without
228 See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 706–07 (2010) (deciding a case where Congress transferred land to a private party to evade First Amendment violation).
229 See, e.g., Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 183 (“The First Amendment does
not, of course, license people to trespass on private real estate in order to speak.”);
Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 25 (“There is no First Amendment right to trespass.”).
230 See Netanel, supra note 3, at 12, 40 (“The notion that copyright’s internal free
speech safety valves substitute for First Amendment scrutiny falls apart . . . . [G]iven
changes in copyright doctrine, copyright’s internal safety valves have become woefully
inadequate to that task.”). In a recent article, Netanel seems to have become more
optimistic that these doctrines can meaningfully restrain copyright law. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA
L. REV. 1082, 1084–85 (2013) (“Golan and Eldred impose potentially significant First
Amendment constraints on copyright protection . . . .”).
231 See Denicola, supra note 24, at 299–300 (arguing for a First Amendment privilege because the protection of the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use are inadequate); Henry S. Hoberman, Copyright and the First Amendment: Freedom or Monopoly of
Expression?, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 571, 594 (1987) (calling for a First Amendment privilege
because “[c]ourts can no longer rely on a variety of flawed exceptions to copyright law
to ensure the free flow of information”); Netanel, supra note 3, at 40.
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some theory of what level of free speech protection is adequate. Since
there is no objectively correct (or even widely accepted) theory of the
correct balance between free speech protection and other social values such as economic incentives for creating new original speech,232
the argument is necessarily subjective.
Another way of saying this is that objectors who argue that the
First Amendment dictates narrower copyright and greater free speech
protection do not seem to appreciate an important irony in their
argument.233 According to the objectors, existing courts have watered
down copyright’s internal free speech protections to undesirable
levels.234 But, if this is so, it makes little sense for the objectors to
argue for those very same courts to create, and to then robustly apply, a
new doctrinal protection such as a First Amendment privilege.235
Every legal theory requires a judge to administer, and a First Amendment privilege can be watered down just as much as copyright’s internal protections can (if the privilege is even created in the first
place).236 The mere fact that judges currently administer the property theory in a way that is perceived as undesirable is not an objection
(or, at most, is a purely results-oriented objection) to the theory itself.
V.

LIMITATIONS

OF THE

PROPERTY THEORY

Although the property theory provides an important foundation
to explain the First Amendment exemption for copyright law, it does
not save all of copyright law. As this Part will explain, some features of
the existing copyright statute—most notably the criminal enforcement and moral rights provisions—cannot be exempted from First
Amendment scrutiny under the property theory.237 I do not regard
232 See supra text accompanying notes 161–64.
233 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System? 1 (Law Sch.
Univ. Chi., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 422, 2013).
234 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 3, at 13–23 (discussing the weakening of the idea/
expression dichotomy and the fair use defense).
235 Netanel seems to be of two minds when it comes to creating a First Amendment privilege for copyright. Compare id. at 41 (arguing that copyright should be
subject to external First Amendment scrutiny in the same manner as defamation),
with id. at 83 (arguing that courts should strengthen the fair use defense instead of
applying direct First Amendment scrutiny). In any case, many other scholars have
explicitly called for courts to create a First Amendment privilege. See, e.g., Denicola,
supra note 24, at 299–300; Hoberman, supra note 231, at 594.
236 This is not to deny that the rhetorical framing of an issue can affect how judges
perceive it. See supra text accompanying notes 150–51. But that is not an objection to
the analytical correctness of the property theory.
237 I should make clear that I am not saying that the criminal enforcement and
moral rights provisions are necessarily unconstitutional. I am merely saying that they
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this as a serious defect in my argument: my goal in this Article is to
rehabilitate the property theory in the face of the literature’s harsh
and cavalier dismissal of it, and my thesis requires only that the property theory can save most of copyright law, as well as explain and justify
leading cases such as Eldred and Golan, both of which involved broad
challenges to the copyright scheme. The property theory need not,
and does not, justify every specific feature of the present copyright
statute.
A. Criminal Copyright Enforcement
The reason that the criminal enforcement provisions cannot be
saved by the property theory is simple: at the core of my argument is
the fact that copyright law is content neutral at the level of the copyright statute. The reason that this is the correct level to analyze content neutrality is because the passage of the copyright statute by
Congress is the only government action involved in most instances of
copyright enforcement, and the First Amendment only applies to governmental and not private action.238 This rationale does not apply,
however, when it comes to criminal prosecution: under a straightforward application of traditional state action principles, a decision by a
federal prosecutor to prosecute is state action and is accordingly subject to First Amendment analysis at the level of that decision.239 And
in the context of criminal copyright infringement, a decision to prosecute will almost inevitably consider the content of the allegedly
infringing work.240
I should note an important wrinkle in this argument. Although,
as a straightforward matter of normal state action principles, a decision to arrest or prosecute is certainly state action, a number of courts
have held that a government decision to arrest or prosecute for crimicannot be justified under the property theory. The property theory is merely one—
though I regard it as the most important—theory for copyright’s exemption from
First Amendment scrutiny.
238 See supra Section II.A.
239 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608–10 (1985) (recognizing a First
Amendment defense for selective prosecution). Nicholas Rosenkranz has argued
that, as a matter of textualist logic, the First Amendment is limited to “Congress” and
therefore does not cover executive action. Rosenkranz, supra note 97, at 1266. However, such a position is not supported by existing doctrine, and is therefore not part of
my argument.
240 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-71.010
(1997) (directing prosecutors to consider the “nature . . . of the infringing activity”).

2013] p r o p e r t y t h e o r y o f c o p y r i g h t ’ s 1 s t a m e n d . e x e m p t i o n

571

nal trespass to tangible private property is not state action.241 Based
on these cases, one could make a reasonable argument that criminal
prosecutions for copyright infringement ought not be considered
state action either.
Although the argument is reasonable, I believe the better view is
that criminal prosecution for copyright infringement is state action.
The legal rationale for holding the prosecution of criminal trespass to
not be state action is that the police and prosecutors are assumed to
be merely neutrally enforcing a private property owner’s complaint
and not exercising any kind of prosecutorial discretion based on the
content of the speech at issue.242 This assumption may or may not be
well founded in the tangible property context; it is manifestly untrue
in the copyright infringement context.243 Unless the Department of
Justice adopts some policy that resembles automatically prosecuting
all cases of criminal copyright infringement where copyright owners
request it—which is not going to happen—criminal copyright prosecutions are likely to remain non-neutral as to content (at least at a
subconscious level), and thus will not fall within the property theory.
B. Content Discriminatory Copyright Rights
A second limitation on the property theory is that, as has been
noted above,244 the present copyright statute is not entirely content
neutral, even at the level of the statute itself. For example, the conferral of moral rights limited to works of visual art (and not other visual
works),245 and special provisions governing non-dramatic musical
works246 and teaching content,247 are content distinctions drawn by
the statute itself. The property theory cannot justify these provisions.
241 See, e.g., People v. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336, 345 (Ill. 1992) (holding that arrest
and prosecution of a petition signature-gatherer not state action); City of Sunnyside v.
Lopez, 751 P.2d 313, 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (holding police arrest of anti-abortion protestor not state action); State v. Horn, 407 N.W.2d 854, 859–60 (Wis. 1987)
(same); see also State v. Marley, 509 P.2d 1095, 1099, 1103, 1112 (Haw. 1973) (holding
that prosecution for criminal trespass not unconstitutional “in the absence of a showing of discriminatory intent”).
242 See DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d at 345 (“[D]efendant was not arrested because of the
content of his speech or prosecuted because of his expressive activities. He was
arrested and prosecuted simply because he refused to leave Dominick’s property.
The State action in this case was directed exclusively at enforcing the trespass law.”).
243 See supra text accompanying note 240.
244 See supra text accompanying notes 181–87.
245 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
246 See id. § 115 (2006 & Supp. V).
247 See id. § 110(2)(B) (2006).
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I am also not attempting to provide an exhaustive list of all the
content-specific measures in the statute.248 Such a list is both difficult
to compile—because the Supreme Court has not provided a clear definition of what constitutes “content” regulation249—and largely beside
the point of my argument. The key point is that the core exclusive
rights of copyright law that are enumerated in § 106 (to reproduction,
derivative works, distribution, and public performance and display)250
are not content discriminatory as they are written in the statute.251
The common argument that copyright is broadly content discriminatory is thus misplaced. Again, my goal in this Article is to argue that
the property theory is important to explaining the First Amendment
treatment of copyright law, not that it saves all of it.
I should note that the content discriminatory provisions at copyright’s periphery may well be constitutionally defensible if one takes a
more high-level approach: that is, if one looks to the underlying policy
rationales for the doctrine rather than to the black letter doctrine
itself. As a matter of underlying policy rationales, the rationale for the
prohibition against content discrimination is to act as a prophylactic
measure against the possibility of viewpoint discrimination by government officials, and since copyright is clearly not viewpoint discriminatory there is little reason to apply the doctrinal rule to it.252 But, as
has been emphasized, my argument here is doctrinal,253 and as a doctrinal matter the prohibition on content discrimination is well settled.254 As such, the provisions of the copyright statute that make
express content distinctions cannot be justified under the property
theory as I have articulated it. But if a better understanding of the
property theory can shift the scholarly conversation away from arguing that copyright is broadly unconstitutional to arguing about the
constitutionality of its individual provisions, then much progress will
have been made.
248 See, e.g., id.; see also id. § 113(c) (limiting the scope of rights in the display of
useful articles in “advertisements” and “news reports”).
249 See supra note 187 (collecting citations).
250 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. Even the right to performance through transmission,
which is limited to “sound recordings,” id., is not reasonably seen as a content specific
measure because it governs only the medium and not the information content being
transmitted. A regulation specific to sound and not to other communicative mediums does not seem any more “content” based than a zoning ordinance that prohibits
noise but not other types of nuisances.
251 See supra Section III.A.
252 See supra text accompanying notes 156–57.
253 See supra Section IV.A.
254 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740 (2011).
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C. The Property Theory and Other Forms of IP
In this Section, I will briefly explore the implications of the property theory for other forms of intellectual property. As I shall discuss,
the property theory has less explanatory power in these areas than in
the context of copyright law. However, my analysis will also show that
the property theory still has important implications for these areas.
1.

Patent Law

At first glance, the area of intellectual property that might be
thought to most strongly reflect the property theory is patent law.
Like copyrights, it is well settled doctrinally that patents are a species
of property for constitutional purposes.255 And, like copyright law,
patent law has long-enjoyed a de facto exemption from First Amendment scrutiny. To the extent that the exemption of patent law from
First Amendment scrutiny is even noticed, the fact that patents are
considered private property is viewed as a central explanation.256
Yet patent law’s exemption from First Amendment scrutiny is in
fact quite inconsistent with the property theory. Unlike the situation
of copyright law, where the grant of a copyright is automatic and the
only state action occurs at the level of the passage of the copyright
statute, the grant of a patent is done on a case-by-case basis by the
Patent and Trademark Office.257 Thus, the proper level of abstraction
to analyze for content and viewpoint neutrality—the level of state
action—is at the level of the individual patent. And individual patents
are quite often content and viewpoint discriminatory in their claimed
subject matter, which should subject them to heightened scrutiny.258
255 Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of
Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007).
256 See Thomas, supra note 129, at 606 (“More like a private property owner exerting the trespass law to eject an unwelcome speaker, the relationship between the patent right and a particular constitutional guarantee appears more tangential.”).
257 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006) (providing for individualized examination). One
might argue that the PTO’s discretion is so constrained during patent examination
that its actions should not be considered in a First Amendment analysis. However, as
I have argued elsewhere, this view of the PTO as performing a ministerial role is
mistaken. Despite frequent protestations to the contrary, the PTO in fact exercises
enormous discretion in shaping the content of patent rights. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The
Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2011) (“[A]
central tenet of the patent system—automatic calibration of reward to contribution—
is an illusion.”).
258 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,311,211 (filed Jan. 14, 1999) (delivering electronic
advocacy messages); U.S. Patent No. 7,996,262 (filed July 18, 2008) (making political
contributions using frequent flier miles); U.S. Patent No. 8,286,286 (filed Sept. 8,
2009) (cushions for Islamic prayer).
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Moreover, on the criterion of overwhelming private ownership
power, patent rights can facilitate private power over speech just as
much as copyright rights can. For example, a method patent covering
a particular piece of advertising provides just as much, if not more,
control over subsequent distribution of the underlying message than a
copyright over the same advertisement; and a software patent259 can
provide much greater control than a software copyright. Yet patent
law has none of the safeguards that copyright law has against the
threat of private control over speech: patent law has no fair use
defense,260 and although it does forbid the patenting of an “abstract
idea,”261 this prohibition is much weaker than the idea/expression
dichotomy in copyright law.262 The sum of the situation is that,
viewed through the lens of the property theory, it is patent law that
has the greater First Amendment problem, not copyright law.263
2.

Trademark Law

One observation that cuts against the descriptive force of the
property theory is that courts have proven somewhat receptive to First
Amendment arguments in the trademark context.264 If trademarks
are also “property” and contain internal fair use protections,265 the
259 See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 101 (2000) (arguing that
software can constitute speech and software patents therefore pose First Amendment
problems).
260 Id. at 150 (arguing that a fair use defense for patent law may be necessary to
ameliorate First Amendment tensions).
261 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010).
262 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 296 (2003) (contrasting patent law’s protection of ideas
with copyright law’s non-protection of them).
263 But see Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 24, at 3 n.3 (arguing that patent
law does not generally confront free speech issues as copyright does); Lemley &
Volokh, supra note 3, at 234 (arguing that patent law does not implicate speech
except in isolated circumstances).
264 See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2008) (creating a limited First Amendment privilege that “[a]n artistic work’s use
of a trademark that otherwise would violate the Lanham Act is not actionable unless
the use of the mark has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or . . .
explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work” (quoting Mattel Inc. v.
MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted)).
265 Trademark law has two different fair use doctrines. There is the “descriptive”
fair use defense, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006). There is also the “nominative” fair use defense that is recognized in some circuits but not others. Compare
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing defense), with PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243,
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logic goes, then the property theory should predict that trademark
enforcement is subject to essentially no external First Amendment
scrutiny.266 The fact that courts in fact sometimes do invoke the First
Amendment, over and above the internal doctrines of trademark law,
then calls the validity of my descriptive argument into question.
My response to this critique is twofold. As an initial matter, the
property theory in fact predicts that the First Amendment would play
a more direct role in the trademark context than in the copyright
context, for three reasons. First, trademarks have a weaker claim to
being “property” than copyrights do.267 Among other things, trademark protection is effectively revoked if the mark becomes such a feature of common language that it is deemed generic,268 whereas vested
property rights such as copyrights and patents are generally not subject to revocation merely because continued protection turns out to
be inconvenient.269 Second, trademark law is content discriminatory—the central rule of trademark law is the prohibition of uses that
are likely to confuse consumers270—in a way that copyright is not.271
Third, although trademark law has some internal protection for free
speech principles, including the limitation of liability to commercial
use,272 the fanciful/descriptive distinction,273 and the statutory and
256 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the invocation of the defense), overruled on other grounds
by KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004)
(declining to adopt nominative fair use analysis).
266 Although less extensive than in the copyright context, the literature arguing in
favor of applying First Amendment scrutiny to trademark law makes the same basic
argument as in the copyright context. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham
Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1715 & n.149 (1999); Lisa P.
Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381
(2008).
267 Cf. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989)
(describing trademarks as “ ‘quasi-property rights’ in communicative symbols”).
268 See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12.1 (4th ed. 2008) (calling this “genericide”).
269 Cf. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2002) (identifying the
policy rationale of genericide as facilitating additions to common language).
270 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
271 The originality requirement and idea/expression dichotomy of copyright law
are constitutionally mandated. See supra text accompanying notes 194–202. The likelihood of confusion requirement, even though it has a compelling policy rationale, is
not constitutionally required. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522, 539–40 (1987).
272 See Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The Lanham
Act is constitutional because it only regulates commercial speech, which is entitled to
reduced protections under the First Amendment.”).
273 See Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 611 & n.2 (7th Cir.
1965) (explaining that fanciful marks get more protection than descriptive ones).
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nominative fair use defenses,274 these doctrines are limited in scope
and are also less flexible than the protections of copyright law.275
They cannot fully protect against the threat of overwhelming private
power.
A second, more important, point is that, even though courts are
relatively more willing to directly apply the First Amendment to trademark cases than to copyright cases, they are still overall extremely
hesitant to do so.276 And the fact that trademark is generally regarded
as property (even if the claim is weaker than copyright) seems a central explanation for this phenomenon. Without the property theory,
the fact that courts are mostly untroubled by laws that facially restrict
the use of certain words (e.g. the word “Olympic”277) would seem puzzling. With the property theory the state of existing doctrine mostly
makes sense. It follows that trademark law does more to reinforce the
descriptive power of the property theory than to undermine it.
CONCLUSION
This Article has made three contributions to the literature. First,
it provides a more concrete account of the property theory than has
occurred previously. For example, when Lemley and Volokh criticize
the property theory, they cite no source for it beyond saying that they
have “heard this view among copyright lawyers.”278 And they conceptualize the property theory in simplistic terms, as entailing that anything labeled “property” is categorically exempt from all First
Amendment scrutiny.279 What I provide is a more detailed, more
nuanced, and more defensible account of the property theory, which
rejects the absolutist conception of property rights. In this way, even
274 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
275 The statutory fair use defense is limited to situations where a defendant uses a
word (that happens to be trademarked) in a descriptive capacity, and even then there
are additional statutory requirements (such as a requirement of fairness and good
faith). Id. The nominative fair use defense is limited to situations where a trademark
is used to refer to the trademark-holder’s product (among other requirements). See
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992).
276 See Ramsey, supra note 266, at 385 (“[C]ourts do not generally apply constitutional analysis to trademark laws or injunctions.”).
277 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 534–43 (1987)
(holding that the special trademark-like protection given to Olympic symbols does
not violate the First Amendment).
278 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 182.
279 Id.; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 27 (“Major premise: [t]here is no First
Amendment right to trample on other people’s property. Minor premise:
[c]opyright is property. Conclusion: [a] copyright infringer can have no First
Amendment defense.”).
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those who disagree with my conclusions should find some value to this
Article, in that it provides a more meaningful target to attack and
criticize.
Second, the Article has explained how the property theory provides a coherent framework to understand the modern doctrine surrounding the intersection between copyright law and the First
Amendment. The property theory explains both why copyright
enforcement is generally exempt from the First Amendment (because
the copyright system is speech neutral) and why this exemption is conditioned on the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense
(because they provide safeguards against excessive ownership power).
As a positive theory, the property theory is superior to the Framers’
intent theory that the Court has relied upon.
Third, the Article has rebutted the criticisms of the property theory that depend on portraying it as an absolutist, formalistic, unthinking, and extremist theory that produces absurd consequences.
Properly understood, the property theory does not say that anything
and everything labeled “property” is automatically exempt from the
First Amendment. The property theory in fact has two internal limits
that accommodate a balance between the social interests underlying
property ownership (including, but not limited to, the incentive for
creation) and free speech concerns.
At a broader normative level, what I am saying is that the property
theory is not—or at least does not have to be—the enemy of protection for free speech.280 The proper balance between free speech protection and private ownership rights is an open question whether we
regulate that balance within copyright law itself (through the fair use
and idea/expression dichotomy) or through an external mechanism
of direct First Amendment scrutiny. A policy proposal that relies on
courts jettisoning existing doctrine—including by considering copyright to be non-property and regulating it as such—may one day find
political appeal. For those who live within the existing system, however, the property theory may well offer a more productive way to
engage with courts and existing doctrine. It is thus eminently
unhelpful to write off the property theory as a “non sequitur”281 or an
“unthinking”282 “‘incantation.’ ”283

280 See David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 141
(2009).
281 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 182.
282 Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 27.
283 Volokh, supra note 106, at 1096 n.217 (quoting Gordon, supra note 28, at
1537).
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